



# **CARBON MONOXIDE AND SYNGAS PIPELINE SYSTEMS**

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## Preface

As part of a programme of harmonization of industry standards, the European Industrial Gases Association (EIGA), publication, *"Carbon monoxide and Syn Gas Pipeline Systems"* has been used as the basis of an internationally harmonized gas association's publication on this subject.

This publication is intended as an international harmonized publication for the worldwide use and application by all members of Asia Industrial Gases Association (AIGA), Compressed Gas Association (CGA), EIGA, and Japan Industrial and Medical Gases Association (JIMGA). Regional editions have the same technical content as the EIGA edition, however, there are editorial changes primarily in formatting, units used and spelling. Also, any references to regional regulatory requirements are those that apply to European requirements.

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#### Amendments to 034/06

Section	Change
Table of contents	Reformatted
Introduction	Deleted paragraph 2 and replaced Western Europe with Europe
Scope and purpose	Added ' <i>These systems have many specialized needs and requirements. However, this document may provide useful background information in other processes where CO is present.</i> '
Other Sections	Minor corrections in spelling and syntax
Appendix	Updated list

## 1 Introduction

This publication has been prepared by a group of specialists in pipeline systems, representing major industrial gases producers in various countries of Europe and North America and is based on the technical information and experience currently available to the authors.

It must be recognized, however, that pipeline systems, developed over 40 years in the various European countries and North America have shown good and comparable safety records, although national practices show many differences in design and operations. Some national authorities have also introduced legislation, which is mandatory for the operators in those countries.

ISO units and corresponding Imperial units in brackets are used in this document. Corresponding values may be approximate.

Those involved in the safe design, operation, and maintenance of gaseous transmission and distribution systems should be aware of various documents, guidance, publications, and standards prepared by various multinational organizations which may be pertinent to such systems. These are listed in Appendix K. In addition to these documents, there are a number of pertinent publications, technical papers, bulletins, etc which provide useful information on materials of construction, metallurgy, environmental degradation mechanisms, etc found also in Appendix K. While the cited references provide valuable background, it cannot be stated that these are all of the standards documents or technical papers published by international organizations that could be pertinent to the subject of this publication.

For those who do not have the experience in design, operation and maintenance of CO/Syngas transmission and distribution systems, this publication serves well as an information resource and the use of which should be under the guidance of experienced pipeline engineers intimately knowledgeable with the subject.

## 2 Scope and purpose

The scope of this document is for transmission and distribution piping systems for carbon monoxide and hydrogen and carbon monoxide mixtures (referred as Syngas in the remainder of this document). Typical arrangements for these pipeline systems are shown in Diagram 1 of Appendix A. It is limited to gaseous products with a temperature range between  $-40^{\circ}\text{C}$  ( $-40^{\circ}\text{F}$ ) and  $150^{\circ}\text{C}$  ( $302^{\circ}\text{F}$ ), pressures from 0,1 MPa up to 15 MPa (2250 psig) and the purity criteria defined in Appendix G.

This document does not apply to the following processes:

- cylinder filling plants
- producing plants
- compressor units
- Bulk facilities (liquid or high pressure gas) at the customer's site up to the point where gas enters the distribution systems
- Piping on specialized equipment and machines.

These systems have many specialized needs and requirements. However, this document may provide useful background information in other processes where CO is present.

The purpose of this publication is to further the understanding of those engaged in the safe design operation and maintenance of transmission and distribution systems. It is not intended to be a mandatory standard or code. *It contains a summary of the current industrial practices.* It is based upon the combined knowledge, experience, and practices of the major producers in Europe and North America as represented by their members on the CGA/EIGA/ CGA Ad-Hoc group on pipeline transportation systems.

Some of the practices represent conservative compromises and not all situations are described. The designer is cautioned that this document is not a complete design handbook and does not negate the

need for competent engineering judgment and interpretation. It is suggested that the user reviews any special problems or concerns with his CO/Syngas supplier who should be able to provide advice and guidance.

Although the technical information provided in this document is not intended to be mandatory, the word « shall » is frequently used. The use of “shall” implies a strong concern that the particular practice referenced be followed for safety reasons. The use of « should » implies that the referenced practice is commonly followed, but recognizes that other safe practices are sometimes utilized.

### **3 Definitions**

- **Distribution piping**

Piping contained on the property (generally owned by the customer) at the use point such as mains, feeders, station connections, and valves.

- **Plant piping**

Piping within the production facility.

- **Transmission piping**

Piping between the production plant boundary and distribution piping boundary, including that which passes over public land and third party property.

- **Copper based alloys**

Copper based alloys used in components for the transmission of industrial gases via pipeline generally contain at least 55 weight % copper. Included within this group are the coppers, brasses (copper alloyed primarily with zinc), bronzes (copper alloyed with aluminium, silicon, manganese, tin, lead, etc) and copper nickels (copper alloyed with nickel).

- **Nickel base alloys**

Nickel based alloys used in components for gas transmission pipeline systems contain at least 50 weight % nickel and nickel contents up to 99+ weight % have been used. However, some tabulations of nickel alloys may list alloys with nickel contents as low as 30 weight %.

Some of the major nickel alloy families and examples of each are as follows : Nickel (Nickel 200), Nickel-Copper ( Monel-400 and Monel-500), Nickel-Chromium (Inconel 600 and Inconel X-750) and Nickel-Chromium-Molybdenum (Hastelloy C-276 and Inconel 625).

For hydrogen-containing gas transmission applications, the potential for hydrogen embrittlement, which is affected by metal strength and hydrogen partial pressure should be considered.

- **Stainless steel alloys**

Ferrous alloys become stainless when they contain a minimum chromium content of at least 10-13 weight %. There are a number of stainless steel classifications, which are dependent upon the alloy content, crystalline lattice, strengthening mechanisms and the ratio of ferrite stabilizers to austenitic stabilizers.

Stainless steel classifications, with examples of each type, are as follows:

- Austenitic (304, 304L, 316, 316L, 321, 347)
- Ferritic (430)
- Martensitic (410)
- Precipitation hardening (17-4 PH)
- Duplex (329, SAF 2205).

The preceding alloy designations were for wrought products but there are alloys such as CF-8, CF-3, CF-8M, CF-3M which are the cast analogs of 304, 304L, 316 and 316 L respectively. Of the various stainless steels, the 300 series stainless steels and their cast analogs are the most commonly used in gas transmission piping systems and have excellent toughness even in high pressure hydrogen.

- **Cobalt alloys**

The commercial listings of cobalt alloys generally start with a minimum cobalt content of at least 40 weight %. Wear resistant alloys such as Stellite 6 or Stellite 6B are sometimes used as coatings on valve trims to minimise erosion damage and improve valve life.

- **Non ferrous alloys**

When the term nonferrous alloys is used in this document, it includes only copper, nickel and cobalt alloys. It does not include aluminium or reactive materials such as titanium or zirconium.

- **Ferrous alloys**

Included in this category are carbon-steel, low-alloy steel and all stainless steels irrespective of whether these alloy families are in cast or wrought form.

- **Microalloyed steels**

The broadest description of microalloying is the use of small additions of alloying elements which achieve improvements of steel properties which seem to be out of proportion to the amount of alloying elements which are added. The steel characteristics which may be improved include strength, toughness, weldability and formability. Reactive metals, rare earths, boron and sulfide shape control additives would be included in the inventory of microalloying agents in the broadest definition.

A more restricted definition of microalloying is the use of small amounts of alloying additions of elements such as vanadium, niobium and titanium which are strong carbide and nitride formers to achieve improvements in strength, toughness and weldability through specific thermomechanical processing steps.

- **Carbon equivalent and the composition parameter**

Carbon equivalent (C.E.) is a parameter used to assess the weldability of carbon and low alloy steels and their susceptibility to cracking during welding. Steels with low carbon equivalents generally do not require any preheating or post heating treatment. Those with intermediate carbon equivalents may require preheating and those with high carbon equivalents require both preheating and post heating.

Generally carbon equivalents of 0.55 and above are considered to be high and carbon equivalents less than 0.35 are considered to be low. However, thickness, weld heat input and other factors enter the overall assessment.

It should be noted that various carbon equivalent relationships have been developed and published over the years. One of the earliest carbon equivalent relationships is the following:

$$C.E. = \%C + \%Mn/6$$

The most common carbon equivalent relationship currently in use is:

$$C.E. = \%C + \%Mn/6 + (\%Mo + \%Cr + \%V)/5 + (\%Ni + \%Cu)/15$$

A major benefit of microalloyed steels is that low carbon equivalents may be achieved and the alloys are more resistant to weld cracking. For steels with lower carbon contents or carbon equivalents, the composition parameter P<sub>cm</sub> has been used as an indicator of cracking susceptibility. An acceptable limit is 0.2% maximum for the following:

$$P_{cm} = \%C + (\%Mn + \%Si + \%Cu + \%Co) / 20 + \%Ni / 60 + \%Mo / 15 + \%V / 10 + 5 \%B$$

- **Base metal**

The material which is to be welded, brazed or soldered.

- **Heat affected zone (HAZ)**

That portion of a weld, braze or solder joint that has not melted but where mechanical properties or microstructure have been altered by the heat of welding, brazing or soldering. It should be noted that certain cutting processes may also result in a discernible heat affected zone.

- **Metastable austenitic Alloys**

These are austenitic alloys which have a chemistry which renders the austenitic microstructure susceptible to transformation to martensite when subjected to thermomechanical processes involving various combinations of strain and reduced temperatures. The relative ratio of austenite stabilizer to ferrite stabilizer is significant in the transformation process.

- **Stable austenitic alloys**

These are alloys which have a high ratio of austenite stabilizers or formers to ferrite formers or stabilizers. When subjected to high strain and reduced temperature, the austenitic alloy will not transform to martensite.

- **Austenite stabilizers or formers**

These are elements which promote austenitic formation and stabilize austenite when stressed at reduced temperatures. They include: nickel, carbon, manganese, nitrogen, cobalt and copper. There are various empirical relationships which quantify the strength of various alloying elements as austenite stabilizer or formers.

- **Ferrite stabilizer or formers**

These are elements which promote the formation of ferrite and stabilize it. These include: chromium, molybdenum, silicon and niobium. Empirical relationships which quantify the strength of the alloying elements in this capacity have been developed.

- **Austenite stability factor ( $\Delta$ )**

Austenite stability factors have been developed to determine when an austenite stainless steel would be likely to transform to martensite at cold reductions as high as 80%. Shown below are

the Griffith and Wright Stability Factor Relationship:

$$\Delta = Ni - [(Cr + 1.5Mo - 20)^2 / 12 - 0.5Mn - 35C - Cu - 27N + 15]$$

and the « modified Post and Eberly » formula (see reference Hydrogen and Materials)

$$\Delta = Ni + 0.5Mn + 35C - 0.0833(Cr + 1.5Mo - 20)^2 - 12$$

Negative numbers indicate a high tendency for austenite to martensite transformations when severely strained.

If Ni content is greater than 10.5% in a 300 series stainless steel,  $\Delta$  is usually positive and the steel is stable.



- **Austenite to martensite transition temperatures**

Ms is the temperature at which metastable austenite transformation to martensite occurs on cooling. The Eichelman and Hull Relationship is as follows:

$$Ms (^{\circ}F) = 75(14.6 - Cr) + 110(8.9 - Ni) + 60(1.33 - Mn) + 50(0.47 - Si) + 3000[0.068 - (C + N)]$$

Md30 is the temperature at which 50% austenite will transform to martensite at 30% strain. Shown below is the relationship developed by Angel]:

$$Md30 (^{\circ}F) = 413 - 462(C + N) - 9.2Si - 8.1Mn - 13.7Cr - 9.5Ni - 18.5Mo$$

- **Chromium and nickel equivalents**

The most common relationship for the calculation for the chromium equivalent is as follows:

$$Cr\ eq = \%Cr + \%Mo + 1.5\ \%Si + 0.5\ \%Nb$$

The most common relationship for the calculation of the nickel equivalent is as follows:

$$Ni\ eq = \%Ni + 30\ \%C + 0.5\ \%Mn$$

In conjunction with a "Shaeffler Diagram" [], chromium and nickel equivalents can be used to predict the ferrite and austenite forming tendencies of austenitic stainless steels in weld metals and cast metals. It should be noted that newer relationships which include the effects of other elements which affect austenite and ferrite formation or stability do exist.

- **Velocity**

The volumetric flowrate at the actual pressure and temperature divided by the pipe inside cross-sectional area

- **Gas Pressure**

The Gas Pressure is the operating pressure of the piping system.

## 4 Design philosophy

### 4.1 General criteria

The safe operation of a transmission piping system depends on various factors which can influence each other. This chapter describes the principal risks and hazards associated with CO and Syngas systems and the manner in which the hazards can be minimized by good engineering design.

A safe carbon monoxide or Syngas piping transmission or distribution system, including all its components, is one that is designed taking into account:

- Local conditions e.g. seismic zone, soil characteristics.
- Applicable piping codes for mechanical design (including pressure rating and wall thickness) and installation.
- Conditions of service with respect to fluid composition, gas velocity, pressure, temperature and dew point.
- Selection of metallic materials.
- Selection of non metallic materials.
- National laws and regulations which apply to gas transmission pipelines generally and flammable systems specifically
- Standards of cleanliness for service
- Industry codes of practice relating to CO and Syngas systems
- Hazard considerations such as flammability and toxicity of Carbon monoxide and Syngas systems

Transmission or distribution pipelines fabricated from non metallic material, such as plastic or composite material are not recommended because of potential exposure to external damage.

## 4.2 Properties of syngas

Syngas, as the term is meant in this document and for the most part in general industry parlance, refers to a mixture primarily of hydrogen (H<sub>2</sub>) and carbon monoxide (CO) which may also contain significant but lower concentrations of methane (CH<sub>4</sub>) and carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) as well as smaller amounts of impurities such as chlorides, sulphur compounds, and heavier hydrocarbons.

It is particularly important to exclude water from pipelines in CO or Syngas service since the presence of water introduces serious corrosion issues, which are not addressed in this document.

If it is known or suspected that water above the level specified in Appendix G is present in the gas stream, then methods and requirements beyond those of this document must be used to ensure a safe and reliable system.

Within the concern of this document, there are many similarities between H<sub>2</sub> and CO as well as some important differences. The requirements for Syngas are a combination of safe practices for H<sub>2</sub> and CO, since both are present in significant proportions. In practice this means that the more restrictive of both the H<sub>2</sub> and CO requirements apply.

To accommodate this it is very helpful to set some thresholds on mixtures of them beyond which we start to consider them Syngas. The following practice can generally be safely used with the requirements of this document provided engineering judgment is applied to verify that no conditions exist in a particular application which would suggest other treatment.

See Appendix G for the composition criteria for application of this document for CO and Syngas services.

### 4.2.1 Flammability

Both CO and H<sub>2</sub> are flammable gases

#### 4.2.1.1 Hydrogen

Hydrogen is lighter than air, highly flammable, easily ignited, heats up when reduced in pressure, does not support breathing and is one of the most difficult gases to prevent from leaking. In the pure state, it presents some unique corrosion mechanisms and when combined with even small impurities (ppm), the corrosion concerns can multiply.

Hydrogen burns in air with a pale blue, almost invisible flame which increases the risk of injury in case of fire.

The lower and upper flammability limits in air are:

LFL : 4%

UFL : 75%

The minimum ignition temperature of hydrogen-air mixtures is 500 °C.

Hydrogen-air mixtures are extremely easy to ignite requiring only 0.017 mJ ignition energy compared to 0.25 mJ for hydrocarbons.

The maximum flame propagation rate is up to 3 m/s in air.

Although auto-ignition of leaks and atmospheric vents is always a possibility with any flammable gas, hydrogen is especially prone to this phenomenon. This is due to hydrogen's low ignition energy and the fact that, unlike most gases, hydrogen increases in temperature when it expands from a higher to a lower pressure. This tendency towards auto-ignition of leaks and atmospheric vents, combined with the difficulty in seeing the flame make small leaks a serious potential personnel injury risk.

In order to mitigate fire risks, fire prevention practice and operator training shall be considered ( see chapters 9 and 10).

#### 4.2.1.2 Carbon monoxide

Carbon monoxide is a flammable gas.

Ignited in air, it burns with a little illuminating blue flame.

This combustion issues carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>).

The flammability limits in air are:

LFL : 12.5%

UFL : 74 %

The minimum auto ignition temperature in air is 630°C.

In order to mitigate fire risks , fire prevention practice and operator training shall be considered (see chapters 9 and 10)

#### 4.2.2 Toxicity

Carbon monoxide is a toxic gas (see note).

For this very reason, any CO or Syngas pipeline project should be considered as “critical” in the sense of requiring a detailed risk management review under the responsibility of the owner.

Note: Carbon monoxide is quickly fixed on haemoglobin, causing a decrease in cellular respiration, which is particularly harmful to the central nervous system .Therefore, it is important to understand the potential effect of exposure to various concentrations of carbon monoxide, which may be encountered so as to provide a safe environment.

A threshold limit value of 50 ppm is recommended for carbon monoxide, as a concentration in air to which nearly all workers may be exposed during an 8-hour workday and 40-hour workweek , without adverse effects.

The consequences of exposure to higher concentrations are shown in the table below:

Table of the effects of carbon monoxide on health and life

Concentration in ppm	Consequences
50	Limit of tolerance for long exposure
50 to 100	After some days ,chronic poisoning
200	Subacute poisoning
1000-1500	Headache, nausea, poisoning and fatal in case of prolonged exposure (more than 30 minutes)
2500	Rapid collapse , death in one or two hours
3760	LC50, one hour exposure
5000	Massive poisoning , death in less than one hour
10000	Death in 10 to 15 minutes
50000	Instantaneous poisoning , immediately fatal

The probability of fatality from a toxic exposure can also be determined using probit equations. Some information about probit equations is given in Appendix J.

To prevent workers from overexposure the general safety requirements according to 9.3 shall be observed .

Besides , special attention shall be paid on training (see chap.9.4)

Notably the following means shall be considered :

- Individual CO detection device
- Permanent CO detection and monitoring in stations
- Leak detection system on pipeline

In case of purging or venting chapter 9.7 shall be observed .

In addition to its own toxicity Carbon monoxide is subjected to dangerous chemical reactions

In contact with certain metals it may create volatile metal carbonyls

Combined with chlorine, CO produces phosgene which is lethal at 50 ppm.

Any toxicity related issue, such as protection against overpressure ,maintenance ,repairs , etc....., shall be dealt with considering this chapter.

#### 4.2.3 Brittle fracture and environmental damage mechanisms

There are a number of brittle fracture mechanisms or degradation effects attributed to hydrogen. These are all described in Appendix B. However, not all of these are pertinent to dry hydrogen gas, dry carbon monoxide and their mixtures. Special attention shall be given to CO and CO mixtures as the simultaneous presence of CO, traces of CO<sub>2</sub> and traces of H<sub>2</sub>O at temperatures below the dew point, will provide a susceptible environment for stress corrosion cracking in the use of carbon and low

alloy steels. Brittle fracture and environmental damage mechanisms that are pertinent to the transmission of these gases via pipelines are as follows:

- For internal corrosion
  - Hydrogen gas embrittlement (HGE) at ambient temperature
  - Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of carbon and low alloy steels in CO environments
- For external corrosion on all pipelines
  - Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of line pipe materials in underground environments.

HGE covers a number of different effects which are described in detail in Appendix B. SCC of line pipe materials in underground environments is a phenomenon which may be linked to a number of factors such as defective coatings, improper cathodic protection and poor soil conditions. SCC of carbon and low alloy steels in carbon monoxide environments is usually attributed to the presence of contaminants in the carbon monoxide. Both SCC mechanisms are covered in more details in Appendix B.

The term “hydrogen attack” is sometimes improperly used when hydrogen pipelines are considered. Hydrogen attack only occurs at temperatures of 200°C or more and consequently is not relevant to hydrogen pipelines (see Appendix B for more information about high temperature degradation modes).

Hydrogen attack only occurs at temperatures of 200°C or more and consequently is not relevant to hydrogen pipelines (see Appendix B for more information about high temperature degradation modes).

The three above mentioned phenomena could lead to catastrophic failures. Approaches by which the risks associated with these mechanisms can be minimised include reductions in global stress levels as described in paragraph 4.3.2.1 and careful materials selection as described in paragraph 4.3. Procedures which minimise H<sub>2</sub>O and CO<sub>2</sub> presence are beneficial for CO services as indicated in paragraphs 4.2.3.

### **4.3 Metallic materials**

#### **4.3.1 Generalities**

##### **4.3.1.1 Strength, hardness and microstructure**

Many metallic materials can suffer embrittlement in environments containing hydrogen gas. These include steels (especially high strength steels), stainless steel, and nickel alloys.

Steels used in hydrogen – containing gas pipeline service should have a maximum hardness of approximately 22 HRC (Hardness Rockwell C) or 250 HB (Hardness Brinell). This hardness limit is approximately equivalent to a tensile strength limit of about 116 Kpsi (800 MPa). Welds should also have a maximum hardness of 22 HRC or 250 HB . It shall be noted that the welded zone is often harder and therefore more susceptible to embrittlement than the base metal.

To achieve an acceptable weld zone hardness, it may be necessary to use lower strength steels than indicated above (500 MPa). Special welding procedures and pre or post welding thermal treatments may be another approach.

In the pipeline systems, there may be a need for “buffers” which are usually seamless pressure vessels. Steels used for seamless vessels may have an ultimate tensile strength (UTS) up to 950 MPa (ISO 9809 and ISO 11120).

The engineering alloys used in critical locations should have high toughness levels in the fabricated condition and be relatively insensitive to welding problems, e.g., hard/brittle areas, microcracks, fissures etc.

There are a number of variables, which can affect the severity of the embrittlement mechanisms encountered such as purity, temperature and pressure. It is generally recognised that the tendency for embrittlement in hydrogen atmospheres increases with increasing pressure.

In general, the following are significant metallurgical considerations for HGE:

- Use of alloys with homogenous fine-grained microstructures is preferred
- Avoidance of excessively hard or high strength alloys, see above.
- Use of steels with enhanced cleanliness so non-metallic inclusions, which reduce toughness and hydrogen embrittlement resistance are minimized.
- Components free from significant surface and internal defects

With respect to the above, there may be somewhat different positions on the degree to which the above are applied and at what pressures. Appendix D covers the preceding in great detail. Each user must determine which of the above considerations should be applied to their specific applications.

The stress requirement for carbon steel is detailed below in subparagraph 4.3.2.

#### **4.3.1.2 Welding**

- Mechanical properties of welds

Welding processes and operators qualification should verify that weld sample meet the same strength and toughness requirement as the parent metal.

- Weld and weld Heat Affected Zone (HAZ)

The hardness level of welds and the weld HAZ should not exceed Rockwell C 22 which is equivalent to 250 HB or Vickers 248. The hardness determination is to be made via microhardness traverses on mounted metallographic samples removed from process/operator weld qualification samples. Production hardness tests should be considered (see subparagraph 7.7.2.4)

#### **4.3.1.3 Surface condition**

Inside surface should be free of defects such as scratches, notches, carbon deposits and corrosion.

#### **4.3.1.4 Hydrostatic tests**

Pipe shall be tested between 75% and 100% of the specified minimum yield strength (SMYS) with a holding time at pressure of at least 5 - 10 seconds depending on the diameter.

#### **4.3.1.5 Inspection**

The materials, source of materials manufacturing, all phases of testing, test specimens, results, etc. shall be available for inspection and approval.

### **4.3.2 Carbon steels**

#### **4.3.2.1 General**

Carbon steel is the alloy family most commonly used in gas transmission pipelines. Various carbon steel specifications for pipelines are listed in Appendix C. The choice of the specific grade will depend on many factors, such as the severity of the service and the availability. Due to the toxicity of

carbon monoxide and Syngas and the possibility of stress corrosion cracking, consideration should be given to maintain low stress on the pipeline. A design factor between 25% and 30% SMYS is recommended in the literature. For example:

- The CO filling pressure is limited to 100 bar in steel cylinder whose service pressure is at least 150 bar. With these conditions, the maximum stress in the steel corresponds to 25% of the SMYS (refer to EIGA Doc 95).
- A design factor of less than 30 % of the SMYS is recommended by the BS 8010 for pipelines conveying category D substances. These category D substances are defined as flammable and toxic substances, which are gases at ambient temperature and atmospheric pressure conditions, thus including CO.

#### **4.3.2.2 Heat treatment**

It is recommended that as-worked mill forms (not normalized) be avoided when practical to do so due to the toxicity of CO. Supplying carbon steel materials in the normalized condition assures the presence of fine grained homogenous microstructures which results in greater toughness and this is preferred. It should be noted that seam welded pipes must be normalized locally in the seam weld (see also subparagraph 7.2.3). Special attention also should be given to the surface condition of alloy mill forms during and after heat treatment

#### **4.3.2.3 Chemistry**

- General

All of the line pipe steels and products from Appendix C have specified compositional range for chemical elements. Chemical composition limits as practiced in conventional carbon steel metallurgy have generally been found to be suitable for Syngas and carbon monoxide pipeline applications. With newer melting processes, reduced sulphur and phosphorous are possible. The use of lower sulphur and phosphorous levels is an approach which enhances steel toughness and therefore should be considered for severe applications.

- Carbon equivalent

The maximum carbon equivalent (CE) is 0.43

- Concentrations of alloy elements

All elements which are deliberately added are to be reported such as calcium and rare earths for sulphide shape control, aluminium for deoxidization and elements which may be used in carbon equivalent calculations.

#### **4.3.2.4 Tensile strength requirements**

The carbon steel alloy grade that is selected should have the lowest possible tensile strength consistent with the actual application. Because of greater susceptibility to some forms of corrosion in a hydrogen or carbon monoxide environment, substituting a higher strength material is generally not an improvement. A maximum tensile strength of 800 MPa (116 Kpsi) is recommended.

#### **4.3.2.5 Toughness requirement**

As the pipeline pressure increases, toughness is increasingly important. Steels and the mill forms identified with the footnote (1) in Appendix C have to meet impact test requirements in the applicable API, ASTM specifications. Generally, the mill forms which have to meet impact toughness requirements are made from killed steel per a fine grain practice.

It is recommended that toughness requirement be considered on certain steel mill forms to be used in Syngas and carbon monoxide pipeline applications. Toughness requirements may be found in References (Mohitpour, Golshan, and Murray, p 594 and 595). It is especially important for applications at pressures of 50 bars and above.

### **4.3.3 Microalloyed steels**

#### **4.3.3.1 General**

Microalloyed steels are described in more detail than other materials in this document to familiarize readers with this relatively new and promising technology. Large scale natural gas pipelines marked the first significant utilization of microalloyed line pipe in gas transmission applications. Since early 1990s, a significant amount of microalloyed line pipe in the API 5L X52 grade has been used to transmit hydrogen gas at pressure in excess of 7 MPa (1000 psi). Microalloyed line pipe is applicable to the transmission of Syngas and carbon monoxide.

This section covers special requirements for the production of microalloyed ERW line pipe intended for high pressure service. The application requires high toughness levels in the fabricated line pipe and relative insensitivity to welding problems as a consequence of possible embrittlement scenarios with may be encountered in service.

Note that none of the API 5L PSL 2 (or PSL 1) grades are listed as “microalloyed steel” in the standard. If microalloyed steel is preferred, the user should specify appropriate supplementary requirements, including added chemistry and property requirements, to attain the benefits of microalloyed steel. It is the responsibility of the user to determine the necessary supplemental requirements. The following sections provide guidance.

Due to the toxicity of carbon monoxide and Syngas and the possibility of stress corrosion cracking, consideration should be given to maintain low stress on the pipeline. A design factor between 25% and 30% SMYS is recommended in the literature.

#### **4.3.3.2 Codes, standard and grades**

Pipe must be manufactured in accordance with all the provisions of the latest edition of API Specification 5L or equivalent except as may be modified by the additional requirements noted in this document.

The specific API 5L grades allowed in microalloyed form for Syngas and carbon monoxide pipelines are X42 and X52. The manufacturer shall not substitute steel intended for higher strength grades.

#### **4.3.3.3 Process of manufacture and material**

The material used in making the pipe shall be basic oxygen or electric furnace steel that is continuously cast. All steel must be fully killed.

The weld seam and heat affected zone shall be heat treated so as to simulate a normalizing heat treatment. Low temperature stress relief of fabricated pipe prior to hydrotesting is permissible.

#### **4.3.3.4 Chemistry**

The sulphur content shall not exceed 0.01% (API 5L PSL 2 limit is 0.015%)

The phosphorus content shall not exceed 0.015% (API 5L PSL 2 limit is 0.025%)

The use of sulphide shape control agents such as calcium is permitted. However, all additions made for this purpose must be reported.

The maximum carbon equivalent (CE) is 0.35. (API 5L PSL 2 limit is 0.43%)

The concentration of any intentionally added element such as rare earths, Ti, Nb, B, Al etc must be reported. Also to be reported are any elements which affect carbon equivalent determinations.

#### 4.3.3.5 Metallographic & microscopic examination

The final ferrite grain size shall be ASTM 8 or finer. Samples of the seam weld will be cut from one pipe length of each one hundred lengths or fraction and examined to ensure that proper weld fusion has been obtained across the thickness of the weld. In addition, Rockwell hardness surveys shall be conducted across the weld-and- heat affected zone of the parent metal and test sections. Hardness shall not exceed 95HRB.

#### 4.3.3.6 Mechanical properties

Actual yield and tensile strengths shall be less than the following maximum above the minimum specified for different API 5L grades:

X-52 24,000 psi (165 MPa)  
X-42 25,000 psi (172 MPa)

The flattening acceptance test criterion for ERW pipe shall be increased to 1/2 of original OD without weld opening instead of that appearing in API 5L.

#### 4.3.3.7 Impact tests

The test temperature will be 0 °C (32 °F). For each heat a set of three transverse and three longitudinal impact specimens will be impact tested. For small diameter pipes, only longitudinal specimens are required.

The following table lists minimum acceptable absorption energies for different sizes of Charpy V notch specimens.

Specimen Size	Absorbed Energy, transverse Ft-lb (J)		Absorbed Energy, Longitudinal Ft-lb (J)	
	Average	Minimum Single	Average	Minimum Single
Full Size	69 (94)	52 (71)	87 (118)	65 (88)
3/4	52 (71)	39 (53)	65 (88)	49 (67)
2/3	35 (48)	35 (48)	58 (78)	43 (58)
1/2	26 (35)	26 (35)	43 (58)	32 (43)
1/3	17 (23)	17 (23)	29 (39)	22 (30)
1/4	13 (18)	13 (18)	22 (30)	16 (22)

Full wall thickness specimens will be used in the testing. Energy absorption values for these specimens will be obtained via linear interpolation between "Standard Sizes".

The largest size Charpy specimen that is consistent with the available wall thickness of the pipe will be utilized for the fracture testing. Transverse specimens will be flattened if necessary to obtain specimens more representative of the full wall thickness. The flattening should be done mechanically with no application of heat e.g., torches.

Ductile shear percentage will be a minimum of 75% for an average of 3 specimens with no single value below 60%.

#### 4.3.4 Carbon-Molybdenum (C-Mo) and Carbon-Molybdenum-Chrome (C-Mo-Cr) low alloy steels

Normally, these high temperature steels are not used in high pressure Syngas or carbon monoxide gas transmission pipelines but for "buffers" see subparagraph 4.3.1.1. However, it is conceivable that these alloys might be welded to a gas transmission pipeline. Accordingly, some of the common ASTM C-Mo and C-Mo-Cr low alloy pipe standards and compositions are listed in Appendix C. It should be noted that the high Cr content grades may be more difficult to weld, subject to cracking and could have local hard spots in the weld HAZ. Consequently, preheating and post weld heat treatments are more often needed for these steels than for carbon steels.



Due to the toxicity of carbon monoxide and Syngas and the possibility of stress corrosion cracking, consideration should be given to maintain low stress on the pipeline. A design factor between 25% and 30% SMYS is recommended in the literature.

#### **4.3.5 Stainless steels**

A chromium content equal or more than 13% mitigates the CO stress corrosion cracking and carbonyl formation. Special attention for the use of stainless steel is required only for Syngas service.

##### **4.3.5.1 Austenitic stainless steels**

Some of the materials listed in Appendix C might be used to transmit Syngas, particularly, at higher pressures. The excellent toughness and ease of welding particularly in field locations are important attributes

These materials might also be used for Syngas transmission at elevated pressures outside of the application range cited in this document. Typically, the presence of even mildly corrosive environments may require that the low carbon (304L, 316L) or stabilized grades (316Ti, 321 and 347) be used when welding is used. In this application, the most likely corrosion site may be on the outside of the pipe. For Syngas service stainless steels with high austenite stability are preferred (i.e., high austenite stability or high nickel equivalents)

Austenitic stainless steels with a positive austenitic stability factor according to a “modified Post and Eberly formula” (see reference Hydrogen and Materials) were found suitable for hydrogen service.

##### **4.3.5.2 Other stainless steels**

Other stainless steels such as ferritic, martensitic, duplex or precipitation hardened may be used in Syngas pipeline components providing they are used at low stress. The toughness of these steels is generally not as good as the austenitic varieties. Strength levels should be minimal and consistent with the application. The fully annealed condition is preferred for the ferritic and duplex steels. Martensitic and precipitation hardening grades should be heat treated to develop strength levels at the low end of the available range.

#### **4.3.6 Nickel alloys**

Many nickel alloys are susceptible to hydrogen embrittlement. Nickel alloys should be avoided unless the user verifies the alloy is suitable for syngas gas service. Monel K-500 and Inconel X-750 which are precipitation hardened alloys may be used with hardness limits in subcomponents where high strength is required. Again, modest strength levels and avoidance of high nickel levels are worth noting. Nickel alloys also suffer from a high propensity to form carbonyls. Alloys with less than 50% Nickel, such as the Incoloy may be acceptable.

#### **4.3.7 Copper and cobalt alloys**

Copper alloys are subject to hydrogen damage when copper contains oxygen. Hydrogen can enter the metal and react with oxygen in solid solution or oxide inclusions to form water. At elevated temperatures, greater than 370 °C (700 °F), steam pressure is high enough to cause cracking. Most copper alloys are deoxidized, and these generally do not suffer hydrogen embrittlement and are suitable for use in CO/Syngas service.

Certain cobalt alloys may be used where abrasion resistance or wear resistance is required. These usually are Stellite formulations. Cobalt alloys are considered acceptable for CO/Syngas service.

#### **4.3.8 Carbonyl formation**

Carbonyl formation is briefly discussed in Appendix B3.8. Published literature suggests that the condition of metal surfaces is very important in the formation of carbonyls. Alloy selection and surface treatment may mitigate carbonyl formation.

#### **4.4 Non metallic materials**

See also ISO 11114-2 for compatibility with non metallic materials

#### 4.4.1 CO compatibility with non metallic material

The chemical resistance of certain elastomers and plastics to carbon monoxide is given in the table below:

Material	Compatibility
Teflon ®	A
Natural rubber	C
Neoprene ®	C
Hypalon ®	B
Butyl rubber	C
Kel-F ®	A
Buna N ®	C

A: good resistance

B: fair resistance

C: poor resistance

#### 4.4.2 H<sub>2</sub> compatibility with non metallic material

Plastics exhibit varying behaviour in the presence of hydrogen.

The temperatures at which the resistance of some plastics in the presence of hydrogen seems assured are given in the table below. In certain cases these values do not exclude the possibility of resistance at higher temperatures.

Material	Temperature (°C)
Plasticized cellulose	20
Cellulose di-acetate	20
Formo-aniline	20
Formo-urea	20
Phenol-formaldehyde	20
Furaphenol	20
Polyamides	20
Polyfuran	110
Polychloroprene	100
Polyepoxydiphenylopropane	90
Polyethylene glycol terephthalate	20
Polyurethane	20
Polyurethylmethacrylate	20
Polyvinyl acetate	20
Polyvinyl chloride	60
Polytrifluorochlorethylene	180
Polytetrafluoroethylene	250
Polyethylene	60
Polyisobutylene	100
Polystyrene	20
Polyacrylonitrile	20
Polyvinyl-vinylidene chloride (20-80%)	60

In using other plastics, it is advisable to conduct suitable strength tests prior to use.

Most elastomers are compatible with hydrogen. Their chemical resistance is given in the table below:

Material	Compatibility
Natural rubber	B
Butyl rubber	A
Silicone rubber	B
Neoprene ®	A
Buna S ®	A
Hypalon ®	A
Viton ®	A
Buna N ®	A

A: good

B: fair

Permeation of hydrogen through elastomers at 25 °C  
(multiply these values by  $10^{-10}$  to obtain  $\text{cm}^3 \text{ S.T.P.mm.sec.}^{-1} \cdot \text{cm}^{-2} (\text{cmHg}^{-1})$ )

Material	Permeation
Natural rubber	492
Butyl rubber	74
Buna S ®	399
Perbunan ® G	158
Neoprene ® G	133
Hycar or 15 ®	74
Polybutadiene	424
Polymethylpentadiene	428
Perbunan 18 ®	251
Isoprene-methacryl-nitrile copolymer	138
Hycar or 25 ®	118
Polydimethylbutadiene	172
Vulcoprene A ®	64
Isoprene-acrylonitrile copolymer	74
Thiokol S	16

#### 4.4.3 Syngas

Non metallic material used in Syngas service should be compatible with H<sub>2</sub> and CO at the operating conditions.

### 4.5 Piping systems

#### 4.5.1 Underground piping systems

Piping should be of all welded construction in accordance with a specification and inspection code such as API 1104, EN12732, EN 14161, EN 1594 (see Appendix K or any other recognized code). Underground piping must be externally coated to an approved specification, to protect against soil corrosion. Reference to current, internationally accepted, coatings standards and specifications is recommended (see Appendix K)

Underground piping should be adequately buried to protect it from frost, casual surface construction, shifting due to unstable soil, back fill damage to the external surface of pipe or the coating, and aboveground loads such as vehicles or equipment moving over the path of the pipeline. Pipe casings or load shields, if required by special agencies, should be installed at railroad or road crossings or where unusual aboveground loading can occur. Casings or sleeves require careful consideration and special measures to avoid cathodic protection problems and arcing, which can be caused due to an electrical connection forming between the sleeve and carrier pipe due to settlement, etc. In general the use of metallic casings or sleeves is to be avoided wherever possible.

Underground carbon monoxide and Syngas piping is vulnerable to damage by lightning strikes or ground fault conditions, which may rupture the pipe material. To reduce the likelihood of one of these occurring, electrical continuity between underground piping and above ground piping, or other metal structures, should be avoided.

Due to the possibility of leaks it is preferable to have no flanged or other mechanical joints underground. If this cannot be avoided then the number should be limited and they should be installed in a way which provides access for inspection and maintenance e.g. in valve pits.

#### **4.5.2 Above-ground piping systems**

Above-ground carbon monoxide and Syngas piping systems should follow good mechanical design practices as applied to any other above-ground piping system. Due to its toxicity, leakage concern are much more important than with other gases. The use of welded connections is strongly recommended whenever this is possible. Above-ground piping should be painted to an approved specification to protect against atmospheric corrosion.

Above-ground portions of pipeline systems should connect to underground portions through an electrically insulated joint to isolate the underground cathodic protection system (see 5.6.4).

All above-ground pipelines shall have electrical continuity across all connections, except insulation flanges, and shall be earthed at suitable intervals to protect against the effects of lightning and static electricity. The electrical resistance to earth of the installed pipeline should not exceed 10 ohms for personnel protection against electrical or high voltage shock.

Flange bolting will provide the necessary electrical bond provided the bolts are not coated with a dielectric material or paint and are well maintained to avoid rust.

In the case of short above ground sections, where insulating flanges are not used, the pipe should be insulated from the support structure by means of an isolating pad.

CO/Syngas piping should not be exposed to external forces which can cause a failure or dangerous situation such as external impingement from hot gas or steam vents, vibration from external sources, leaking oil dripping onto the line, etc.

Above-ground piping systems outside plant fence lines may be subject to deliberate or accidental damage. Consideration should be given to installing pipe and valves below ground, with extensions for above ground operators and instrumentation.

#### **4.5.3 Pipeline markers**

Overhead piping should be colour coded and/or identified. Underground piping should be identified with markers placed on the ground near the buried pipeline. Markers should be suitably spaced to indicate the route of the line.

#### **4.5.4 Corrosion protection**

##### **4.5.4.1 Underground pipelines**

Corrosion caused by galvanic action between the outside of the pipe and the soil is probably the most frequent cause of leaks except for mechanical damage. It is caused by the difference in electric potential between the pipe and the soil which sets up an electro-chemical cell. This electrolytic cell acts to continuously remove metal from the pipe and deposit it in the soil. If not prevented or sufficiently inhibited eventually a hole(s) is made in the pipe during its working life. Corrosion protection is achieved by cathodic protection, either by sacrificial anode or by impressed current, both in combination with electrical isolation by coating. To achieve a good cathodic protection in a given circumstance, it is necessary to understand the soil conditions and the anti-corrosion methods used by near-by pipelines. The advice of an expert in these matters is strongly recommended in known difficult corrosion areas and is a worthwhile precaution in any area. Cathodic protection may be done according to recognized standards, such as NACE RP 177 or EN 12954. It is suggested that electrical isolation (pipeline coating) plus one other of the two methods listed below be employed on every underground pipeline.

- 1) Electrical isolation – this method acts to prevent corrosion by electrically isolating the pipeline from the soil. This is the most basic technique and, as a minimum should be practiced on every section of underground pipeline. The pipe is isolated from the soil directly by an external coating and indirectly by isolating flanges where it connects to above ground piping. The weakness is that even small flaws in the coating become sites for what is often very rapid rates of corrosion. These flaws may be present in the coating as supplied, come from damage during installation, occur as the coating loses its dielectric strength or after some time in service may be caused by bacterial activity. It should be assumed that a number of defects in the coating exist or will come to exist during the lifetime of the pipeline. This does not negate its value but does lead to the necessity of providing another means of protection together with electrical isolation.
- 2) Sacrificial anode – this method acts to prevent corrosion of the pipe by providing a source of material which is more electrolytically active (anodic) than the piping material. Corrosion takes place preferentially on this sacrificial anode and the pipeline is thereby spared – at least until the anode is used up. Sacrificial anodes are most effective when used together with electrical isolation since they are well suited to protecting against small areas of corrosion such as occur at flaws in the pipe coating. However, there is a limited distance in which a sacrificial anode is effective so that many of them are required at intervals along the pipeline.
- 3) Impressed current – To be free of the limited driving voltage associated with sacrificial anode systems, current from some outside source may be impressed on the pipeline by using an anode ground bed and a power source, the most common of which is a rectifier. The rectifier converts AC to DC, and is usually provided with means of varying the DC output voltage, in small increments, over a reasonably wide range. Most pipeline rectifiers operate in a wide range between 10 and 50 volts and can be obtained with maximum current outputs ranging from less than 10 amps to several hundred amps. The anodes employed in impressed current systems generally depend on electrochemical oxidation of water and other chemicals in the soil or electrolyte to exchange current with the environment... Specific materials used for anodes are: graphite (carbon), high silicon iron alloys, platinized titanium or niobium, and certain conductive mixed metal oxides applied to a titanium metal base. Most anodes used in an impressed current system, exhibit an electrical potential that is more noble than iron or steel. Therefore, the anodes themselves remain relatively inert and unaffected by the transfer of current. The source of electric current must overcome this back potential as well as electrical resistance in the circuit before current will flow in the proper direction. Steel anodes, such as rails, are also commonly used, but they will exhibit a wear of 9 kg/Amp.year. They have to be replaced, when necessary.

Because of the complexity involved, it requires the most experienced and specialized knowledge to properly implement. It is strongly recommended that an expert be consulted.

Monitoring of the corrosion protection system at intervals over the lifetime of the pipeline is essential to achieving satisfactory results. In the case of sacrificial anodes and impressed current systems, this requires monitoring the electrical potential at the cathodic protection stations and at monitoring points in between stations.

#### **4.5.4.2 Above ground pipelines**

Because above ground pipelines can be visually inspected, corrosion can be more easily controlled. However, this is only the case if the inspections are frequent, methodical and all the discovered problems remediated.

Uninsulated above ground pipelines should be protected against environmental corrosion by an appropriate coating system, usually paint. The selection of the system will vary with the environment, but as a general rule a system suitable for a chemical plant environment should be used as a minimum.

Insulated above ground pipelines are also subject to environmentally caused corrosion which occurs underneath the insulation and is therefore not visible. This type of corrosion is quite common and is

recognized as a significant problem in industry. Reference could be made to standards, such as NACE RP 01-98. The pipe should be painted before insulating to provide surface protection. The pipeline should be regularly inspected for corrosion under the insulation by removing small sections of insulation at various places and visually checking. A positive indication is cause to remove further samples in the same area until the full extent of the corrosion has been identified. Remediation and reinsulation should then follow.

#### **4.5.5 Leakage surveys**

Pipelines for dangerous gases such as CO and Syngas may present high environmental risks. It is particularly important to periodically examine pipelines with a leak detector. The exact regimen for performing this examination will vary with the population density in the area and national regulations. A suggested minimum would be to examine pipelines once every three months with additional frequency for known leak prone areas such as flanged connections, valve stems, and compression fittings.

In addition, to mitigate the risk of leaks, the installation of a Leak Detection System (LDS) shall be considered, if the pipeline is in the public domain. Such a system can detect a leak in real time and estimates the size and location of the leak which allows operations staff to assess the severity of the leak and the type of response that is required. The Leak detection system and the related monitoring and controlling system must be designed with a high level of reliability.

### **4.6 Hazard analysis and risk assessment**

#### **4.6.1 General**

Some level of risk is inherent to all human activities and positive steps should be taken to reduce the risks to a reasonable level whenever this is possible. Every new transportation pipeline system must be designed, constructed and operated in such a way that the additional risk to people, property and the environment is kept within acceptable limits.

To this end, a safety analysis should be performed on every new pipeline system or significant modification to an existing system. The safety analysis is a proven way to assess the risks of the pipeline system to the environment, the risks to the pipeline from its environment, as well as to define the measures, to be applied during design, construction and operation, to reduce the probability of occurrence and the consequences of abnormal events. See references, such as EIGA DOC 75 about determination of safety distances.

Normally, the level of detail of the safety analysis is based on the population density around the pipe route, the potential severity of an incident, and the likelihood an incident could occur.

The method typically used in a safety evaluation is to determine the individual risk and to show that it is within acceptable limits. It is not unusual to define individual risk, as the probability of a person remaining at a given open-air location at all times being fatally injured as a result of any abnormal event affecting the pipeline and to give an acceptable limit in terms of fatalities per number of years.

In specific areas, such as high population density zones, the societal risk must be taken into account due to the toxic properties of CO.

Local regulations often provide guidelines on performing safety analysis and specify acceptable limits. When no regulation exists, one of the generally accepted country codes such as the Dutch or British regulation is often referred to.

The risk assessment comprises the following steps:

- Assessment of the individual risk, which is the probability of a person remaining at a given open-air location at all times being fatally injured as a result of any abnormal event affecting the pipeline.
- Assessment of the societal risk, in order to take into account the number of fatalities which may occur in case of an abnormal event affecting the pipe, particularly in highly populated areas and in places of public assembly. The required maximum probability of the abnormal event decreases with the number of resulting fatalities.

#### **4.6.2 Identification of the hazards**

The minimum list of hazards to be considered is:

- Damage by third parties
- Use of non compatible materials and equipment at all operating conditions
- Stress corrosion cracking in the presence of CO<sub>2</sub> and H<sub>2</sub>O impurities below the dew point
- Severe internal corrosion in presence of water
- Hydrogen embrittlement for mixtures with hydrogen
- External corrosion due to improper cathodic protection
- Leaks at valve packing, gaskets,..
- Over pressurisation of the pipeline
- Improper inerting procedure
- Improper venting procedure
- Improper operation and maintenance of the pipeline
- Abnormal loads due to land slide, floods, earthquakes, crossing of roads, railways, ..
- Influence of other structures, such as high power electrical lines, electrical railways
- Damage due to an abnormal event on a parallel pipe
- Road accident or fire in the vicinity of above ground parts of the pipeline
- The radiation from a vent fire or a flare

#### **4.6.3 Mitigating measures**

For each hazard, mitigation measures shall be identified, such as:

- Control of third party interference
- Ensuring that the gas feed remains dry
- Increased thickness of the pipe
- Increased pipeline depth
- Installation in pipe ways or corridors
- Non destructive test on welds
- Inerting of the pipe
- Pipeline marking
- Specific pipelines warning devices: marking mats or tapes
- Isolation valves
- Excess flow or low pressure shut down valves
- Leak detection system by dynamic flow analysis
- Physical protections: concrete coating or casing, concrete slabs
- Operating procedures, including: inspection programmes, leak detection surveys, corrosion control programmes, emergency plan, personnel training, information of third parties, collaboration with local authorities

#### **4.6.4 Typical event scenario**

For ease of analysis, the events frequently considered for a pipeline are:

- the full bore rupture
- the 50% full bore
- a small leak (5% of the full bore)

#### **4.6.5 Consequences of these events**

For carbon monoxide and syngas the consequences of a release is the forming of a toxic and flammable cloud in the vicinity. The cloud may ignite. Depending upon the model used for evaluating the toxicity, including possible self evacuation of individuals, the consequences of radiation on individuals may be greater than that of toxicity. Both types of consequences must be considered.

#### **4.6.6 Selection of simulation model parameters**

Models frequently used are dispersion calculation and thermal radiation of flame software, such as PHAST developed by The Det Norske Veritas.

The following items must be taken into account in order to run the simulation model:

- Pressure drop due to the dynamic flow in the pipe
- Transient flow regime due to the decompression of the pipe
- Velocity of the gas at the breach
- Wind speed and direction and air conditions

#### 4.6.7 Criteria for the feared event

A way to evaluate the effect on the environment of a CO/Syngas release is to determine the toxicity risk and the magnitude of the thermal radiation in case of ignition at different distances from the pipe.

##### 4.6.7.1 Toxicity risk

For toxicity, in the absence of local regulations which would take precedence, as a minimum the following two limits should be considered:

- The area of lethal effects : threshold value corresponding to an exceeding of 7000 ppm during 10 minutes (4.5% of fatalities, Probit DNV)
- The area of irreversible effects for human health : threshold value corresponding to an exceeding of 1500 ppm during 30 minutes (Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health equivalent)

It should be noted that circumstances may suggest that additional criteria be included. See also section 4.2.2 and Appendix J.

##### 4.6.7.2 Thermal radiation risk

The Eisenberg method to define the hazard zone is to use the radiation dose approach. This considers that the effect of radiant heat on humans is a function of both radiation intensity and duration of exposure. Eisenberg et al. (reference listed in Appendix K) studied data on the lethality from thermal radiation and concluded that the dosage-response relationship for various probabilities of injury/fatality should be in the form,

$$D = t I^{4/3} \text{ in units of } (W/m^2)^{4/3} - \text{sec}$$

where:

D	=	dosage for various probability of injury
t	=	duration of the exposure, sec
I	=	thermal radiation intensity, W/m <sup>2</sup>

#### Damage Criteria For Thermal Radiation

Damage Levels	Thermal Dosage, D
Extreme Pain	$1.1 \times 10^6$
Second Degree (blistering threshold)	$2.4 \times 10^6$
Third Degree threshold	$7.2 \times 10^6$
Second Degree under 9.3 oz/yd <sup>2</sup> (FRT Cotton)	$10.3 \times 10^6$
1% Fatality	$10.6 \times 10^6$
Second Degree under 6.8 oz/yd <sup>2</sup> (Nomex)	$13.1 \times 10^6$
50% Fatality	$23.0 \times 10^6$
99% Fatality	$65.7 \times 10^6$

Eisenberg's data is adapted for radiation durations less than 45 seconds. Usage of the damage criteria should be limited to short exposure durations.

For longer periods, the thermal radiation limits listed above, compared to the damage criteria of Eisenberg may be used:



- 3 kW/m<sup>2</sup>: for an exposure time of 120 seconds - limit of approach for the public. This is outside the limits of the Eisenberg correlation since the exposure time is greater than 45 seconds.
- 5 kW/m<sup>2</sup>: taken as the radiation level at which breakage of glass by thermal effect occurs and also at which 2<sup>nd</sup> degree burns on the skin of a non protected person exposed for 30 seconds - limit of approach of the operators or other trained personnel. This corresponds to a dose of  $2.6 \times 10^6$ , i.e. close to the blistering threshold
- 12,5 kW/m<sup>2</sup>: taken as the radiation level at which fire propagates on vessels sprayed with water and also the onset of pain on the skin of a non protected person exposed for 6 seconds - limit of evacuation of housing and other normally occupied buildings. This corresponds to a dose of  $1.7 \times 10^6$  which Eisenberg's equation would categorize as extreme pain.

With these criteria, it is possible to transform in distances around the pipe the results of the simulations, in order to identify the zones concerned by the occurrence of the major event. This risk evaluation method is a deterministic approach and is required in certain countries.

#### 4.6.8 Definition of the zone to be studied around the pipe

Taking into account the distances found by the simulation, the zones around the pipeline must be studied for the whole length of the pipe. Since the toxicity of CO must be considered as well as its flammability, larger distances than would have been the case when considering flammability alone are not unusual.

Another widely used method to define the zone around the pipe that could be affected by a leak or rupture is using a potential impact radius. This method is documented in ASME B31.8S and is dependent on the MAOP and outside diameter of the pipeline. In particular areas, compensatory measures will be considered.

#### 4.6.9 Risk criteria

When the probabilistic approach is used, individual and societal risks are considered.

For the individual risk, the probability of fatality of a person permanently present at a given distance of the pipe is computed, taking into account all feared events and their probability.

For the societal risk, taking into account all feared events and their probability, the probability of a given number of fatalities is also computed at a given distance of the pipe.

The risk criteria taken into account depend on the national regulations. The risk criteria, expressed in probability of fatality per year for the individual risk and in probability of a given number of persons for the societal risk, are given in Appendix J for the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom for information.

### 4.7 Siting of stations

#### 4.7.1 General

The location of stations should be chosen with care and, in so far as is practical, to avoid the immediate proximity of vulnerable areas and equipment such as electrical equipment, flammable product storage tanks, public roads, public buildings, car parks and transfer stations.

Siting and safety distances should follow established practices and applicable regulations.

A release of CO or Syngas creates two types of risks, one is the thermal effect, if the release is ignited, the other is the toxicity, due to the presence of CO.

So, the safety distances for Hydrogen stations must be considered as a minimum, see EIGA/CGA/AIGA publications on Hydrogen pipeline systems.

Furthermore, for the toxicity risk, the following types of releases have to be considered for the design and location of stations:

#### 4.7.2 Release of CO/Syngas during maintenance

The mass of released gas is limited to the mass contained in the station, except in case of internal leak of an isolating valve of the pipe or human error.

The parameters to be taken into account for the dispersion study and the definition of the safety zones are the height of the vent, the flow, the velocity and the duration of the gas released. Venting and purging operations are described in section 9.7.

#### **4.7.3 Case of CO/Syngas leaks**

Unless the use of welded and below valves, unexpected leaks to the atmosphere may happen from equipment such as flanges, and valve packings.

Detection means and emergency response time are factors to take into account in the design of the stations

- Stations in the public domain

They are generally along the pipe and emergency response time may be more than ½ hour. The design of the station should be such that there is an acceptable toxicity risk at the fence of the station. See 4.6.7.1.

A possible solution is to install all equipment of the station inside an enclosure equipped with a gas detector. In case of leak, the detector generates an alarm, starts a forced ventilation to dilute and disperse the gas to the atmosphere.

- Stations in production or at customer sites.

They are installed in restricted access areas. Detectors may be installed in order to detect leaks. Skilled operators are able to intervene within a few minutes.

### **5 Piping, valves and equipment**

#### **5.1 General criteria**

This chapter describes how the design philosophy presented in Chapter 4 can be applied in practice to piping, valves, specific piping components and equipment configurations.

#### **5.2 Material selection criteria**

Selection of material for pipes, valves, equipment, etc. shall be in accordance with sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. .

Due to the hazardous nature of the gas, pressure containing parts such as piping, valve bodies, strainer and filter housings, etc. shall be made of metallic materials only. The use of non-metallic materials shall be limited to services such as valve internals (inserts only), external coatings, etc. which do not provide primary mechanical strength.

One of the most important criteria is resistance to stress corrosion cracking and hydrogen embrittlement. The risk of these occurring is increased at higher temperatures and pressures and is mitigated by low stress levels. Therefore, material selection, fabrication processes, and material thicknesses should be chosen with a view towards achieving low residual stresses. Typical methods of lowering stresses once the operating temperature and pressure have been decided are closer pipe support spacing, thicker pipe walls, thermal relieving residual welding stresses.

There are no special velocity restrictions for piping in carbon monoxide or Syngas service other than the underlying economics. However, the sonic velocity of hydrogen is approximately four times that of most flammable gases. Therefore, close attention should be paid to possible erosion and abrasion at such items as control valves and relief valves which usually will have sonic or near sonic velocities. Because of the high sonic velocity, it is quite possible that problems will arise at differential pressures which would not have caused a problem with most other gases.

#### **5.3 Electrical hazardous area requirements**

As carbon monoxide and Syngas systems may pose a fire or explosion risk, electrical systems must be in accordance with the applicable codes. These provide requirements and suggestions for determining the level of hazard (classification) and mitigating the risks involved. Typically used codes are:

- National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70

- IEC 79
- NFPA 496, 497
- American Petroleum Institute RP 500 A,B,C
- European directive ATEX 94/9

It is recommended that as a minimum either NFPA 70 or IEC 79 be used.

The type of electrical equipment which may be installed and the installation methods depend upon the level of hazard classification and are described in the prescriptive sections of the codes.

It is worth noting that the equipment and piping should be carefully bonded and grounded to drain static electricity and to carry electrical fault currents to earth ground, to prevent the release of electric sparks which could ignite CO/Syngas leaks in the area.

## **5.4 Piping**

Welded connections are preferred and should be used wherever practical to minimize potential leak sources. Threaded connections which are seal welded are considered as welded connections for this purpose. Either seamless or longitudinally welded pipe and wrought or machined fittings shall be used except in exceptional circumstances e.g. absolute unavailability.

### **5.4.1 Venting and flare destruction systems**

Carbon monoxide and Syngas vents must be contained, collected, and disposed of safely. Carbon monoxide and Syngas in small amounts, such as from filters, may be vented directly to the atmosphere, if routed to a safe location. Otherwise, carbon monoxide and Syngas vent streams must be contained and disposed of properly. For this purpose, pressure relief valves are considered large vents. The almost universally used method is a flare which destroys the gas by burning.

The back pressure created by the collection system must be properly accounted for in the design, especially on safety relief valve discharges (API RP 520, 521 are often used reference documents for this).

The same materials as are used elsewhere in the pipe line should also be used for vent collection and disposal piping.

The design of a vent collection and flare system for flammable gases is a complex design task and should only be performed by persons familiar and experienced in this area. For a good reference and a layman's understanding API 521 a good source.

When attaching to an existing vent collection and / or flare system it is essential to understand the basis of the system's design so that the designer's intent is not inadvertently compromised. The performance of the new attachment affects the performance of the existing system, possibly negatively. Issues such as back pressure on devices, back flow, instantaneous volume, inert purge, materials of construction, etc. are typically involved. The owner of the existing vent / flare system is usually the best resource to ensure compatibility and it is greatly preferred that he be directly involved in reviewing the design and fabrication of the attachment and that his approval be obtained. If this is not possible, then an analysis of the existing system shall be performed from existing documents and inspection of the equipment and the results used to design the attachment.

### **5.4.2 Flanges and gaskets**

Where welded connections are not practical flanges are the next best choice. Leak resistant flange types such as raised face, tongue and groove, or ring joint flanges shall be used. Gasket materials shall be appropriate for the design pressures and temperatures, and be hydrogen and carbon monoxide compatible and leak resistant. In addition, consideration should be given to resistance to fire, due to the flammability of the gas. In general filled spiral wound steel gaskets are preferred with raised flanges, but composition gaskets which are graphite based are also used at lower pressures. Soft metallic rings are preferred with ring joint flanges. Overall then, a Teflon or graphite filled spiral wound gasket with a raised face flange or a copper ring with a ring joint flange are typical choices since they embody the desired features to a large extent. Since small leaks to atmosphere present a significant safety risk, flange covers should be considered.

### **5.4.3 Threaded connections**

These shall be used only where welded (including seal welded threaded connections) and flanged connections are not practical. The sealant shall be hydrogen and carbon monoxide compatible and should be high temperature resistant to reduce the risk of leaks during a fire. Typical uses of threaded connections are to match equipment, especially instruments.

### **5.4.4 Instrument tubing**

The use of continuous runs shall be maximized to reduce the number of fittings since these can be leak sources. Instrument tubing shall be stainless steel (See section 4.3.5) with compression fittings or welded.

## **5.5 Valves**

### **5.5.1 General**

The major concern specific to carbon monoxide and Syngas service is to prevent leakage either to the ambient or across the valve.

Leakage to ambient is most frequently caused by packing and bonnet leaks and to a lesser extent by leaking castings. To minimize the potential for leaks the following, or equivalent, shall be considered:

- Double packing or bellow seal valves
- Live loaded bolted bonnet
- Valve bodies to be hydraulically leak tested
- Soft seat in a metal retainer for in-line automatic valves and automatic vents; specify bubble tight shut off
- Metal to metal seat or soft seat in a retainer for in-line manual valves; these should be combined with a means of positive isolation if used to block flow before attempting maintenance or inspection inside the line.
- Metallic seat with valve outlet blocked. Typical arrangements used are double valves, blind flange, plug, or cap (threaded connections are acceptable).
- No threaded connections in assembly of the valve body; preference for no through bolting or body flanges
- Mainline isolation valves should be of full port design, when pipeline pigging for inspection is foreseen

### **5.5.2 Valve functions**

#### **5.5.2.1 Isolation valves**

Isolation valves with lock out capabilities are used to isolate portions of the pipe line in emergencies or for routine maintenance and inspection. These should be installed in an accessible location since they may need to be manually closed on an emergency basis.

For safe maintenance access it is necessary to have a means of positive isolation with a supporting lock out or tag out maintenance procedure. Typical accepted arrangements are double block and bleed valves, blind flange, double trunnion mounted ball valves with a body vent or spool removal.

These are typically ball, plug, gate, or butterfly type valves.

#### **5.5.2.2 Emergency isolation valves**

Emergency Isolation Valves (EIV) are used to provide emergency blockage of the flow. They may be manual, automatic, or both. Although the number location and type of EIV's depend on the specifics of the inspection, maintenance and risk management strategies, as a minimum they shall be provided at the beginning of the pipeline and at each user.

EIV's shall be capable of being fully closed to ensure against gas leakage and in the case of automatic valves shall be designed to close on instrument air, signal, hydraulic and electrical failure. A

typical arrangement would be spring return actuators which fail closed. Fail in place valves are not acceptable.

When automated, EIV's are typically ball or gate valves and are of fire safe construction. When manual, these valves are typically gate valves. It is often advisable to install a means of positive isolation along with an EIV.

### **5.5.2.3 Control and pressure reducing valves and regulators**

These are used for flow and pressure control functions. The use of hardened seats and plugs or other special design features should be considered when the pressure drop through the valve or regulator is greater than 10% of the upstream pressure because of the high sonic velocity of Syngas. Erosion, abrasion, and excessive noise should be addressed in the design.

These are frequently globe valves, but notched ball valves are also used.

Regulators should not vent process gas to the ambient in an uncontrolled way. They should either vent internally or the vent should be treated as in section 5.4.1.1 above.

### **5.5.2.4 Safety relief valves**

The purpose of safety relief valves is to protect the system and its components from damage caused by pressures above the maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP). Carbon monoxide and Syngas service does not in general require a more or less severe analysis than most other flammable gases except that special attention should be paid to the potential of the gas leaking through the valve when it is closed and the requirements of section 5.4.1 above for safe venting must be followed. The number, location, type, sizing criteria, safe venting, and inspection intervals for pressure relief devices are governed by local regulatory authority and these requirements must be strictly followed. Typically pressure vessels, for example large filter housings, will fall under the pressure vessel regulations and the balance will fall under the piping and / or pipe line regulations.

Some of the dos and don'ts as typically practiced are:

- Safety valves should be located as close as possible to the item which they protect.
- Back pressure on the safety valve discharge and even back flow contamination, caused by the vent collection system, shall be considered.
- Consideration shall be given to the reaction forces when a safety valve discharges.
- Safety valve relief and vent system design methods may be found in reference documents, such as API RP 520 and 521.
- Although it is preferable not to, it is sometimes necessary to install block and / or by-pass valves together with safety relief valves to meet local inspection/testing regulations or when connecting to an existing vent or flare system. However, this presents inherent safety risks since the safety valve could be blocked. Therefore, a careful analysis of the entire system, its components, and the supporting operational and maintenance procedures (e.g. lock out) by an experienced professional shall be performed.

It is sometimes impractical to safely dispose of vented gas at pressure let-down stations of the pipeline since the toxicity precludes direct venting of significant quantities to the atmosphere. In such instances, an alternate method should be considered, which is to protect against overpressure by the use of two automatic isolation valves in series. These valves will be controlled by triple redundant pressure transmitters with two out of three voting or a rupture pin system.

### **5.5.2.5 Manual vent and drain valves**

Typical practice is to provide positive sealing through the valve by redundancy. The most common arrangements used are double valves, blind flange, plug, or cap (plugs and caps should be threaded without seal welding since it is necessary to remove them for the vent valve to perform its function).

These are typically ball, plug, gate, or globe valves.

### **5.5.2.6 Excess flow valves (EFV)**

These are usually designed similarly to emergency isolation valves (EIV).

#### **5.5.2.7 Check valves (non-return valves)**

Carbon monoxide and Syngas do not present special concerns for check valves besides leakage. The concerns are similar to those for automatic valves and a soft seat in a metal retainer or specially lapped metal to metal seats are preferred, especially when small back leakage would present a significant risk. As with all check valves installation in the proper orientation can be crucial. Typically check valves are not considered fully reliable flow stoppers. Therefore, a check valves shall not be used as a substitute for an isolation valve.

### **5.5.3 Valve type summary**

#### **5.5.3.1 Ball and plug valves**

Ball and plug valves are inherently quick opening and good sealing. They can be manually or automatically operated. They are frequently preferred as isolation, emergency isolation, excess flow, and vent and drain valves. They can also be used as control valves in certain circumstances although their control characteristics are generally less precise than globe valves or butterfly valves. Ball valves are usually full ported and must be full ported if it is required to run a pipeline internal inspection device through them. Ball and plug valves are typically used in small sizes.

#### **5.5.3.2 Butterfly valves**

Eccentric disc wafer valves (high performance butterfly) may be used. They can be manually or automatically operated and can be used as a control valve when the pressure drop across the valve is not too large. The main disadvantage is that the valve seat is particularly exposed to particulate damage. If these are chosen, they shall be double eccentric and bubble tight shut off. Butterfly valves are not suitable to run a pipeline internal inspection device through since the disc and pin sit permanently in the flow path.

This document does not take a position on the use of these valves other than to acknowledge that there is difference of opinion about their use with some pipe line operators allowing them in certain circumstances and others not permitting them at all. However, as there are potential benefits in certain situations, a description of them was considered appropriate to include.

#### **5.5.3.3 Gate valves**

Gate valves are rugged proven valves which are typically used to block flows. Although they can be automated they are by far most often manually operated. The main disadvantage is that, except for certain special designs with soft sealing strips on the disc, they are not as tight sealing as ball, plug, butterfly, or globe valves. To mitigate this they should be specified with flexible wedges (gates). Gate valves are suitable to run a pipeline internal inspection device through them.

#### **5.5.3.4 Globe valves**

Globe valves are commonly used in control applications and where a tight shut off is a pre-eminent concern. They can be manually or automatically operated. They are widely used as control valves because of the precise nature of their control characteristics. They are also used as automated vent and isolation valves because of their tight shut off. They are more used at smaller sizes than larger sizes. The gas which flows through a globe valve is forced to change direction. This is how its precise control characteristic is created, however, it makes them susceptible to erosion and abrasion. For this reason the use of hardened plug and seat materials should be considered in applications which have a large pressure drop across the valve. The high sonic velocity of Syngas means that this problem occurs at lower pressure drops than with most other gases.

#### **5.5.3.5 Pressure relief valves**

These are valves which are specifically designed to prevent over pressurization of an item or system by automatically and reliably stopping the increase of internal pressure by venting gas once a pre set

pressure has been reached. Pressure relief valves are self contained in that they do not require operator or control system actuation to perform their function. There are several different types and styles of safety relief valves including direct acting, pilot operated, variable back pressure, etc. Direct acting spring actuated relief valves are acceptable. Internals shall be of carbon monoxide and Syngas compatible corrosion resistant materials. Soft seats shall be used to provide a tight shut-off.

Pressure relief valves typically must meet international, national, and local regulatory requirements which typically include design, materials of construction, testing, quality assurance, inspection in service, and often official sealing after the relief pressure has been set to guard against tampering.

Although many materials may be used for the valve body, it is preferable to use either carbon steel or stainless steel since these materials are economic and avoid some of the potential corrosion issues which could arise if impurities entered the pipe line.

#### **5.5.3.6 Check valves (non-return valves)**

These are valves which are specifically designed to permit flow in one direction and to stop it in the reverse direction. There are numerous types including swing, flapper, ball, poppet, spring loaded, gravity operated, hydraulic assisted, etc. Swing and flapper types are most often used in larger sizes and ball or poppets in very small sizes (<2"). To minimize back leakage when the valve is closed, a soft seat in a metal retainer or specially lapped metal to metal seats are preferred, especially when a small backwards flow would present a significant risk. As with all check valves, installation in the proper orientation can be crucial. Typically check valves are not considered as reliable flow stoppers as isolation valves and, therefore, a check valve shall not be used as a substitute for an isolation valve.

#### **5.5.4 Miscellaneous valve issues**

##### **5.5.4.1 Packing**

Positive sealing of packing glands is important in carbon monoxide and Syngas service. Packing materials shall be carbon monoxide and Syngas compatible and suitable for high temperatures to better maintain their integrity in case of a fire. Graphite based compounds are typically used. Double packing should be considered to mitigate the chance of leakage to atmosphere which can present a toxicity or/and flammability safety risk.

##### **5.5.4.2 Damage from particulates**

To protect soft seats from possible damage from particulates carried with the gas, a strainer of 300 microns (50 mesh) or finer may be installed upstream of valves or valve clusters with soft seats which are normally open to flow during operation. Typically this excludes vents, drains, and pressure relief valves (pressure relief valves should not have a strainer upstream of them in any case since a partially blocked strainer would reduce the relieving capacity).

#### **5.6 Other equipment**

##### **5.6.1 Strainers and filters**

Strainer and filter installation is recommended to avoid contamination, particularly upstream of pressure control and metering devices, as the sonic velocity of Syngas is very high compared with most gases. The housing material should as a minimum be equivalent to the pipe and the internals should be of a corrosion resistant metal.

##### **5.6.2 Flow measuring devices**

Orifice plate, venturi and turbine meters are frequently used.

The selection of flow meter type is normally based on the accuracy requirements for the required range of gas flow to meet customer requirements. Instrumentation for converting the output from the

volumetric primary device into a mass flow may use an Integrated Electronic System, which may comprise the following:

- pressure transmitter
- temperature transmitter
- differential pressure transmitter
- mass flow computer

### **5.6.3 Rupture discs**

Rupture discs should not be used, due to toxicity risk.

### **5.6.4 Insulating joints**

Insulating joints are essentially two pieces of pipe separated by a material with a high dielectric constant (insulator) so as to electrically isolate two systems or items. Typically this is done to create separate zones of possible corrosion for example between underground and aboveground segments of the pipe line. Although the design of these devices is well known, there is still a possibility that a spark may be created between the electrically isolated sections and that this spark might ignite a fire. Proper specification and installation of insulating joints is necessary to mitigate this risk. Therefore, a knowledgeable and experienced person should review the specification and installation of this item.

### **5.6.5 Flexible connections (hose, expansion joint, etc.)**

When piping and equipment warms up, it expands putting stress on the system as it changes shape to accommodate the now longer material. A flexible connection is a device to allow for this growth by its inherent flexibility; it expands so the piping does not have to. Unfortunately, flexible connections are significantly less robust in service than pipe, and this presents a significantly increased risk of failure, which would be dangerous with any flammable gas, and even more so with carbon monoxide and Syngas. The preferred solution is to design flexibility into the piping system by means of expansion loops (out of plane runs of pipe) and this shall be the design used unless there is no practical alternative. In case a flexible connection is unavoidable it shall be made of corrosion resistant metal, have a liner, and shall be inspected frequently in service to detect early signs of incipient failure. Expansion joints may be in accordance with existing standards, such as of the Expansion Joint Manufacturer's Association (EJMA). Proper specification and installation of flexible connections is necessary or they may fail prematurely or even immediately. Therefore, a knowledgeable and experienced person should review the specification and installation of this item.

### **5.6.6 Miscellaneous equipment items**

In general, the concern with most piping and equipment items in carbon monoxide and Syngas service is similar to other flammable gas services. The major difference is that leaks are more likely to occur and that the action of carbon monoxide as a toxic gas must be taken into account. The design, installation, and inspection of these items should follow the principals and suggestions in this document as they apply to each item.

## **6 Cleaning**

### **6.1 General requirements**

#### **6.1.1 Cleaning strategy**

Cleaning of a CO/Syngas pipeline system is normally accomplished by a combination of building clean and final cleaning after construction. During construction, visual is performed on sections of pipe as they are assembled, making sure there is no gross contamination left in the pipe. In addition, fabrication techniques are used which do not introduce contamination to the pipe. This is followed by a thorough cleaning of the pipeline system after construction. It is both impractical and impossible to fully inspect a pipeline system for cleanliness after construction and final cleaning, so the methods



used must provide an adequate cleanliness level. It is therefore strongly recommended that a detailed written procedure, including the sequence for construction and cleaning, be well established and carefully followed throughout the project. The piping system design must be compatible with cleaning, construction and pressure testing methods to be used. A visual inspection for cleanliness should be applied throughout the material preparation and construction stages.

### 6.1.2 Standard of cleanliness

A system is considered to be clean for CO and Syngas when internal particulate matter has been extensively removed. The cleaning process shall assure the removal of contaminants such as dirt, water, filings, scale, weld spatter, paints, or other foreign material from the interior of the pipeline system. This level of cleanliness is often referred to as “commercially clean”. Contractual requirements or customer specifications may require a more stringent cleaning process.

### 6.1.3 Cleaning methods

The cleaning of carbon monoxide and Syngas pipelines may be accomplished by any one, or a combination of more than one, of the following methods:

- Pigging
- Mechanical scraping
- High velocity gas purge.

Pigs are commonly used for internal cleaning of pipelines. The types of pigs available fall into the following broad categories:

Type	Application
Gauging	To ensure freedom from obstruction
Foam (or soft pig)	Dewatering Removal of fine, loose debris and dust
Rubber disc or cup	Dewatering Removal of loose debris
Wire brush	Removal of pipe scale
Scraper	Removal of adhered particles and rust
	Removal of pipe scale Removal of adhered particles and rust

In general, pigs will be fabricated from materials that would be compatible with carbon monoxide and Syngas. For this reason, along with the level of cleanliness required, pigging is normally the primary choice for cleaning of carbon monoxide and Syngas pipelines. The correct selection and use of pigs to suit the anticipated condition of the internal surface of the pipe at the various stages of cleaning will minimize the likelihood of damage to the pigs and lead to the desired level of cleanliness.

### 6.1.4 Pipeline components

Equipment such as tees, valves, check valves, insulation joints, regulators, meters, filters and other fittings will normally be purchased with cleaning levels acceptable for carbon monoxide and Syngas service and installed after the completion of pipeline cleaning operations. Visual inspection of equipment items should be carried out just before installation to ensure that the required standard of cleanliness has been met. If items are identified as being deficient in meeting cleaning criteria they shall be cleaned at the site until the desired level of cleanliness has been achieved.

Branch lines and parallel lines shall be treated as separate systems for the purpose of cleaning, and the final tie-ins shall be made after cleaning is completed. This is necessary to be certain that the cleaning medium whether pig, high velocity gas, or scraper actually reaches all the pipe and that no branch has been short circuited.

### **6.1.5 Welding**

The pipe sections shall be welded together using a recognized welding process. Ultimately, it is essential that the internal weld surfaces are smooth and substantially free of slag, beads or loose debris thereby preserving the internal cleanliness. It is recommended that the root pass of all butt welds be done with a welding technique which uses an inert gas purge since this minimizes the chance of slag deposits on the underside of the weld. Refer to section 7.3 for further information on welding requirements.

### **6.1.6 Pressure testing**

Pressure test should be performed in such a way that cleanliness of the pipe is not compromised. (see section 7.7.1 for further details)

### **6.1.7 Installation of pipeline equipment**

On completion of final cleaning all aboveground connections can be installed, including pre-cleaned and pre-tested tees, valves, fittings, branch piping and other items. See paragraph 7.6.2 for non-destructive testing requirements.

## **6.2 Post-installation cleaning**

### **6.2.1 General**

All line pipes should be installed with sections of pipe that are generally in accordance with section 5.4. Otherwise there are no other special requirements. It is important, however, to ascertain the likely condition of the piping (e.g. degree of mill scale) as delivered from the stockist or manufacturer's works to ensure that the proposed cleaning method is capable of achieving the desired specification of the pipeline owner.

Carbon monoxide and Syngas Pipelines are normally cleaned using various types of pigs; wire, foam, scraper, dewatering, line-sized, and oversized. They are pushed through the pipeline using a pressurized system.

A pig launcher shall be used for injecting pigs into the pipeline. The pig launcher shall have a quick-opening closure, a full-pipe-size check valve, and adequate shutoff valves to permit rapid and frequent launching of the pigs.

A pig catcher shall be used to capture pigs exiting the pipeline. The pig catcher shall prevent the pigs from becoming airborne and endangering personnel. The pig catcher shall be designed to minimize any damage to the pigs so that they can be reused.

Before and during use, pig launchers and catchers should be kept clean.

Only new pigs or used ones which have been shown to be in good repair shall be used at the start of cleaning. Pigs may be reused during cleaning until they become worn and cannot perform their intended function efficiently.

The velocity of the pigs should be controlled as indicated in this specification. This can be done by controlling the amount of the pig driving media flowing into the pipeline behind the pig(s). Back pressuring the pipeline to control the velocity of the pigs is also acceptable.

The cleaning operation is normally done after the hydrostatic or pneumatic pressure tests are complete as this accomplishes dewatering as well. If necessary, the cleaning operation may precede a pneumatic pressure test.

Pipeline equipment such as tees, valves, check valves, insulation joints, regulators, meters, filters and other fittings shall not be installed until the pipeline has been cleaned. This minimizes the chance of damage to the items or pigs and provides unambiguous flow paths during cleaning .

### **6.2.2 Propelling medium**

When compressed air is used for propelling pigs through the pipeline, residues such as water, oil, and particulate should be removed from the air stream. Generally, compressed air is passed through a drier, for example with dual and switchable beds of silica gel or activated alumina, an oil coalescer, and a filter before entering the system being pigged. The dry, oil-free air shall have a dew point of -40°C (-40°F) or lower and a hydrocarbon content of less than 5 mg per cubic meter.

When dry, oil-free nitrogen from a liquid nitrogen pumper, gaseous nitrogen tube trailer or other source is used, precautions must be taken to provide appropriate ventilation as an asphyxiating atmosphere may be created. Employees at the exit end of the pipeline are susceptible to large volumes of nitrogen. Workers must be trained for the potential hazard of anoxia or asphyxiation.

### **6.2.3 Typical cleaning sequence**

The following steps outline the cleaning sequence that begins after the hydraulic pressure test

#### **6.2.3.1 Dewatering**

Dewatering shall be done after the pipeline has been hydrostatically pressure tested. Dewatering should be completed using dewatering pigs made of hard polyurethane foam with sealed, double-dished ends. Wire brushes or scrapers shall not be attached to nor included as part of these dewatering pigs.

The propelling media for the pigs shall be oil-free air or nitrogen as defined in paragraph 6.3.2 of this specification.

The pigs shall effectively seal against the interior pipe wall to minimize water leakage past the pigs.

The pigs shall be run through the pipeline until no water is accumulated at the pig catcher. At a minimum, no less than three dewatering pigs shall be run through the pipe.

To avoid potential mechanical damage to the pipeline and also for safety reasons, the velocity of the initial dewatering pig should not exceed 5 km/h (3 mph) and the velocity of subsequent dewatering pigs should not exceed 16 km/h (10 mph).

#### **6.2.3.2 Drying**

After the line has been dewatered, the water adhering to the interior pipe wall shall be removed by running new, bare polyurethane drying pigs through the pipeline.

The propelling media for the drying pigs shall be dry, oil-free air or nitrogen as defined in paragraph 6.3.2.

For good results and also for safety reasons, the maximum velocity of the drying pigs should be around 6.5 km/h (4 mph).

These drying pigs shall be run through the pipeline until they do not absorb any more water. This can be determined by feeling the drying pig surface for dryness.

Drying pigs may be reused if they are not saturated with water and less than 70% of their surface area is discoloured.

This operation shall continue until the pipeline interior surface is completely dry. This will be considered to have been achieved when the interior dew point at the drying pig receiving end is measured at -20°C (-4°F) maximum.

### **6.2.3.3 Dry cleaning**

After the line has been dried, the line shall be cleaned of rust and mill scale by using wire-brush and foam pigs.

The propelling media for the pigs shall be dry, oil-free air or nitrogen as defined in paragraph 6.3.2 of this specification. The dew point of the propelling media for final stages of wire brushing and foam pigging shall be controlled at or below -20 °C (-4 °F).

The wire brush pigs shall be made of hard polyurethane foam covered with flame-hardened steel bristles and shall be new and free of all oil and grease.

Pigs shall be launched one at a time, or in trains, at a frequency that will prevent pigs from gathering and lodging in the pipeline, or successive pigs or trains of pigs from arriving together at the pig catcher or terminus of the pipeline segment being cleaned.

For good results and also for safety reasons, the maximum pig velocity for this cleaning operation should be around 40 km/h (25 mph).

Wire-brush pigs shall be run until no dirt, dust, or any other debris is deposited at the end of the pipe, and the dew point at the receiving end is below -20 °C (-4 °F).

The wire-brush pigs may be reused if they have an interference fit with the pipeline interior, have over 90% of wire bristles available for cleaning, and have no accumulation of deposits in the bristles.

Wire-brush pigs may require up to 50% more driving media than foam pigs. This extra media requirement is necessary because of large amounts of flow bypassing the wire brush pigs because of the long wire bristles. The contractor may elect to run a foam pig directly behind the wire brush pigs to limit the bypass of the driving media around the wire brush pigs.

After wire-brush pigs have been run, foam pigs shall be run until the line is clean.

Following completion of cleaning, all precleaned valves, tees, and meters shall be installed.

### **6.2.3.4 Final drying**

Final drying is typically accomplished by the intermittent purging and bottling of the pipeline with dry nitrogen gas until the desired dew point level is achieved. At this point all precleaned valves, tees, and meters shall be installed.

Vacuum Drying can be utilized after executing the nitrogen purge drying sequence, if lower dew points are desired. Vacuum Drying can achieve dew points in the range of minus 70°F to minus 105°F.

### **6.2.4 Maintaining cleanliness**

During the installation of the pipeline, ingress of contaminants should be avoided as much as possible (e.g. oil, grease, soil, debris, and runoff water).

### **6.2.5 Inspection**

After satisfactory completion of the construction, testing and cleaning processes, the pipeline shall be inspected at both the inlet and discharge ends and at all accessible points to assess the condition of the internal surface. A record of the inspections that is descriptive of the interior pipe surface shall be maintained as part of the pipeline quality control dossier.

### **6.2.6 Acceptance criteria**

The pipeline is considered clean when no more dust leaves the pipeline and the foam pigs emerge with a light grey or light brown colour that has penetrated the pig's surface no more than 3 to 6 mm (1/8 to 1/4 in).

### **6.2.7 Sealing, inerting, leak testing and monitoring**

Following the pipeline inspection and acceptance of the standard of cleanliness, the pipeline will be sealed at all open ends with either welded caps or blind flanges and purged with nitrogen. Once the oxygen content and dew point have reached the required levels, the pipeline system shall be sealed and pressurised with nitrogen to about 0,06 MPa (10 psig). The pressure shall be monitored on a regular basis to check the absence of leaks and maintained in this condition until the pipeline is required for service with the product gas. As nitrogen is used, warning panels against anoxia must be affixed.

## **7 Construction**

### **7.1 General criteria**

The total installation of the pipeline, including testing and cleaning, should be undertaken by a reputable organisation with a proven record of experience in pipeline construction. The fabrication, testing and cleaning procedures shall have been reviewed and approved by the purchaser before work is begun. The detailed construction programme, including the sequence of testing and cleaning procedures, shall be defined to suit specific project requirements. The design of the pipeline system shall have made provision for the cleaning and pressure testing methods to be used.

The construction of the piping systems should follow good engineering practice in accordance with recognised national or international piping and construction codes.

Systems of work shall be in place to ensure the safety of the construction personnel in the fabrication and erection areas and the general public in any adjacent populated areas.

Appropriate efforts shall be made to ensure the quality and the operational safety of the piping being installed.

The piping system shall be fabricated and installed in accordance with the piping and construction codes as defined in the project specification.

Necessary precautions and measures should be taken to protect materials and piping from damage caused during off-loading, storing, installation, or other activities. Piping should be carefully stored and handled to prevent contamination of the interior of the pipe and to prevent damage to the exterior protective coating (if applied).

The line pipe shall be fabricated and/or installed in accordance with approved drawings. Installation of the line pipe shall include all manual valves, special piping items, control valves, relief valves, in-line items and pipe supports as required by the approved drawings.

If required, the piping system shall be constructed to accommodate the passage of instrumented internal inspection devices. This criterion does not apply to meter stations or regulator stations.

Procedures for any remedial work that might be required should be agreed with the purchaser prior to the work being performed.

## **7.2 Specification and manufacture of line pipe material**

### **7.2.1 General requirements**

All essential requirements for the specification and manufacture of the line pipe which have a direct bearing on the cleaning process should be formally submitted to the pipe supplier as part of the full technical specification for the purchase of the line pipe. The origin and quality control of the purchased line pipe shall be fully traceable and the relevant documentation submitted to the purchaser for retention.

### **7.2.2 Codes and standards**

Generally, the manufacturing process, material, grade, and inspection requirements for the piping should be in accordance with standards, such as EN 10208-2 or API 5L specification or other codes as defined in the project specification as a result of purchasers requirements, national regulations, or other reasons. The material composition should generally be in accordance with the aforesaid codes and the manufacturers' normal standard for line pipe.

### **7.2.3 Manufacturing process**

Both seamless and welded pipes may be used. In the latter case, the line pipe shall be manufactured using either the High Frequency Induction (HFI) or Electric Resistance Welding (ERW) or Submerged Arc Welding (SAW) process. Line pipe manufactured by other processes should not be used without the prior approval of the purchaser.

### **7.2.4 Heat treatment**

Heat treatment for either the longitudinal weld (normally carried out as part of the continuous HFI or ERW or SAW production process) or the pipe body should be such that the finished line pipe is essentially free of mill scale.

### **7.2.5 Hydrostatic test of the line pipe**

Regardless of the nature of the pressure test carried out in the field, the manufacturer of the line pipe shall, as part of the manufacturing and quality control process, carry out a hydrostatic test on each section of the finished pipe. The test should be in accordance with the requirements of the applicable national regulations or codes, such as EN 10208-2 or API 5L, unless dictated otherwise in the project specification as a result of the purchaser's requirements.

## **7.3 Construction plan**

A formal construction plan should be developed which provides a comprehensive, logical progression of work including proper supervision, regular inspection, and verification.

## **7.4 Pipe fabrication and welding**

### **7.4.1 General**

To the greatest extent possible piping shall be assembled by welding. Where welded connections are not possible, flanged connections shall be used wherever practical. Threaded connections shall be kept to an absolute minimum.

To preserve the internal cleanliness of the piping, the internal weld surfaces must be smooth and substantially free of slag, beads or loose debris. The Gas Tungsten Arc Welding (GTAW) also known as Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG) shall be used for the root pass on these tie-in welds. Subsequent weld passes can be made using either the GTAW or other weld processes as preferred. This process will in itself produce the desired smooth finish on the internal weld surface. When using the Manual Metal

Arc (MMA) welding technique, also known as the Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW), followed by cleaning of the internal weld surfaces with wire brush or blade tool pigs to remove slag, beads and loose debris and thereby achieve the desired finish.

Gas Metal Arc Welding (GMAW) is an acceptable practice for shop pre-fabrication of piping.

Inspection should be made of all pipe spools and components prior to assembly to ensure that flange or weld faces are clean and that there is no dirt or contamination inside the pipe. Any debris or foreign material inside the pipe shall be removed before pipe welds or flange connections are made.

As service pressure increases, greater attention to welding processes may be required, for example TIG root passes, post weld heat treatment, etc. Fracture mechanisms analysis may be required.

#### **7.4.2 Qualifications**

All pipe welding shall be performed in accordance with welding procedures and by welders qualified to the procedures in accordance with the piping code as defined in the project specification and as required by local or national regulations.

#### **7.4.3 Backing rings**

- Backing rings, which remain in place, are not allowed as they will interfere with pipeline pigging operations and weld inspections.

#### **7.4.4 Preparation for welding**

All weld joints shall be prepared in accordance with the approved welding procedure and the relevant piping code. The longitudinal seams of welded pipe in adjoining pipe sections shall be staggered.

#### **7.4.5 Welding requirements for materials**

Use of low hydrogen welding rods is recommended. Keeping the weld rods dry during the construction period is very important. Inspections shall be performed according to 7.6.

The welding procedure should be selected so that the finished weld hardness is less than 22 Rockwell C, equivalent to 250 HB or 248 Vickers in the weld itself and the heat affected zone.

Post weld heat treatment should be considered to limit the maximum hardness or large variations of hardness in the heat effected zone, particularly in the case of pipeline materials with a carbon equivalent equal to or greater than 0,43.

In the case of austenitic stainless steel, the ferrite content in the welding zone should be limited to 7%. Too low ferrite content may lead to hot cracking.

### **7.5 Assembly and installation**

#### **7.5.1 Alignment**

Before bolting up, the alignment deviation of the flange face and flange bolt holes shall not exceed the values defined in the project specification; all bolts shall pass easily through both flanges.

The tolerance on the termination of all piping other than flanged connections shall be as shown in the design drawings and specifications.

#### **7.5.2 Flanged joints**

Piping must not be hung from flanges of compressors or other equipment without adequate supports.

Gaskets shall be installed in accordance with the design drawings. Gasket leaks are often a result of improper alignment and not following recommended tightening procedures. When gaskets containing non metallic parts are used, non metallic materials must be chosen according to paragraph 4.4.2. The

use of gasket types or materials other than those defined in the project specification shall be prohibited unless approved by the purchaser.

Bolting shall be pulled up gradually using a crossover sequence. The bolt type and size shall be matched to the flange and gasket material. If, in special circumstances, bolt loads are specified, the contractor should use bolt tensioning equipment to achieve the correct bolt loading. If torque values are specified, the contractor can use torque wrenches via the nuts to develop the necessary bolt load. The use of torque wrenches might dictate the use of a suitable lubricant on the bolt threads. If no bolt loads or torque values are specified, bolts shall be tightened sufficiently, in accordance with good engineering practice or vendor information, to ensure that the joint is capable of holding the tightness test without leakage.

The re-use of any gasket is prohibited; it is essential that new gaskets be inserted every time a flange is released. When a joint leaks on pressure test, the joint shall be re-made using new gaskets.

Gaskets, nuts and bolts shall be visually inspected to ensure that they are clean and in good condition. If so desired, a suitable lubricant, as defined in the project specification, can be applied to bolt threads and bearing faces of nuts and washers before bolts are inserted into flanges and tightened.

Alternatively, lubrication can be avoided by the use of appropriate, corrosion resistant materials for bolts, nuts and washers.

### **7.5.3 Insulating joints**

Insulating joints for cathodic protection systems, particularly those of the monoblock type, are prone to damage and leakage if overstressed either laterally or longitudinally. Proper alignment of flanged isolation joints is also critical to proper installation of sleeves covering bolts for proper isolation after tightening. To reduce the likelihood of joint deformation beyond the acceptable limit, it is important that joints are adequately supported and correctly installed in accordance with design drawings and good construction practices. See also paragraphs 4.4.2 and 5.5.5. These joints shall be tested for electrical isolation prior to pipeline being placed in service.

### **7.5.4 Threaded joints**

Any threaded joints should be kept to a minimum based on the products that this specification is covering. It is recommended that any threaded joints directly connected to the pipeline without a method of isolation shall be properly seal welded. All threaded end connections open to the atmosphere shall be sealed with a plug. Clean cut taper threads in accordance with the design requirements shall be used and shall be fully deburred.

Stainless steel tubing is recommended for instrumentation.

### **7.5.5 Tubing**

Stainless steel tubing is recommended for instrumentation. Copper tubing shall not be used for circuits which are exposed to the pipeline gas.

### **7.5.6 Valves**

All valves shall be supplied with identification tags or plates and installed in the location defined by the design drawings. Identification tags or plates shall remain attached to each valve after installation. It is not permitted to interchange valves.

To minimise exposure to damage, valve top works, actuators and other associated equipment should be stored in a clean condition and installed as required after major construction work has been completed.

All valves shall be installed in accordance with the piping design drawings and handled in a way which maintains their cleanliness and prevents ingress of moisture, oil, dust, and other contaminants. Particular care should be taken with valves, whether manual, automated or pressure relief, to ensure that both the flow direction and orientation are correct.



The following precautions shall be observed with respect to the installation of pressure relief valves and other pressure relief devices:

- Apart from those required for construction and testing purposes, no pressure relief valves or other pressure relief devices shall be installed until all pressure testing, cleaning and blowout work have been completed.
- It is recommended that vent piping be fitted with protective devices that will prohibit restrictions to the proper functionality of the relief valve, like bird nests or ice.
- All relief valve vents must be piped to a flare.

Before welding any valve into a piping system, the valve shall be fully opened. The top works should be removed to prevent thermal distortion of the valve components. Soft seats and other components are usually vulnerable to damage by heat. After welding, soft seats and other vulnerable components should be checked. If excessive force is required to operate the valve remedial action shall be taken.

#### **7.5.7 Supports, guides and anchors**

Supports, guides and anchors shall be positioned and secured before the installation of the piping. Additional temporary supports can be used during installation but they shall not be welded or bolted to any permanent structural members. Temporary supports, guides and anchors must be removed before the pipeline is commissioned.

All welded connections, such as earth clamps or supports, attached directly to process piping or equipment intended for service at elevated pressures shall be made before pressure testing. Welding on pressure containing equipment after the successful completion of a pressure test is not permitted.

Any support for cathodically protected piping must be electrically isolated so that the protection of the pipeline is not compromised.

#### **7.6 Inspection and examination**

During construction, regular on-site inspections should be made to ensure that correct procedures for installation are being observed. During and after construction, the pipeline should be inspected and tested in accordance with the relevant piping code and procedures as defined in the project specification. Such inspections should, as a minimum, include those to verify the following:

- Correct materials (as a minimum by stamped markings and / or accompanying paperwork. It is recommended that spot Positive Materials Identification be performed as well.)
- Pipe concentricity
- Specified wall thickness
- Internal cleanliness
- Protective coating integrity
- Electrical isolation
- Absence of mechanical damage e.g. gouges, dents etc.
- Joint preparation
- Welding fit-up
- Welding
- Absence of arc burns
- Review of radiographic or other examination

#### **7.7 Non-destructive testing**

##### **7.7.1 Pressure testing**

The pipeline shall be subject to either a pneumatic or a hydrostatic pressure test at the pressure required by the code to which the pipeline has been constructed. The preference is for a hydrostatic test. Whichever test method is selected, it shall be conducted at a convenient point in the overall pipeline construction to suit project requirements and to minimise the likelihood of costly rework.

The strength test should be completed by conducting a hydrostatic test using clean water. The test shall be carried out in accordance with the code to which the pipeline has been designed and constructed.

The filling and testing operations shall be planned as a continuous operation to ensure that water does not remain in the pipeline system for any longer than necessary, particularly if below freezing ambient temperatures are foreseen during the test period. Adequate safety precautions to minimise the potential consequences of a pressure release must be taken while the test is in progress. If a pneumatic test is conducted and nitrogen is used as the test medium, the risk of exposure of personnel to oxygen deficient atmospheres must be assessed and appropriate precautions taken.

Water for testing and any subsequent flushing should be clean and free from any suspended or dissolved substance which could be harmful for the pipe material or which could form deposits within the pipeline. For carbon steel pipelines, the pH should be between 5 and 8 and the chloride not more than 1000 mg/litre (50mg/litre for stainless steel). It is best practice to minimize the time the hydrotest water remains in the pipeline, as water promotes corrosion and biological activity. If the water stays more than 8 days in the pipeline, the pH should be limited between 6 and 7.5 and chloride concentration less than 500mg/litre (5mg/litre for stainless steel). Special care is needed in dealing with water sources containing potentially harmful chemicals or bacteria.

After the completion of a hydrostatic test the water should be preferably removed immediately either by draining or pigging or a combination of the two. See 6.3.4.

Any residual water in a CO or Syngas pipeline following a hydrostatic test could lead to failure mechanisms within the pipeline therefore it is imperative to achieve a maximum dew point of  $-50^{\circ}\text{C}$ .

For reasons of practicality, in the case of pipe tie-ins or final closing welds it may be acceptable to waive the need for a pressure test provided that a prescribed alternative method of non-destructive testing is carried out and local regulations do not prohibit this.

## **7.7.2 Non destructive examination (NDE)**

### **7.7.2.1 General**

All NDE examinations shall be performed by a licensed qualified operator with the exception of dye penetrant and magnaflux examination which may be applied by a trained assistant and interpreted by a licensed operator. All NDE activities shall be fully traceable preferably with a weld map. A report shall be made identifying each weld which is examined and showing its location, the weld procedure used, the weld operator who made the weld, NDE procedure used, and results including repairs.

Longitudinal pipe seams, which exist as a result of the pipe manufacturing process, are exempt from on-site non destructive testing (See Section 5.3).

### **7.7.2.2 Radiographic examination**

All radiographs shall be of the entire length of the weld (full radiography). It is required that 100% of the butt weld joints in the pipeline be fully radiographically examined as defined in the project specification. Final closing welds must be radiographed.

In situations where the radiological hazards presented by X-rays (or Gamma rays) cannot be accommodated by reasonable means, 100% non destructive examination by an equivalent method such as UT may be substituted.

### **7.7.2.3 Dye penetrant and magnaflux examination**

Socket weld and fillet weld joints cannot be suitably radiographed but should be examined using dye penetrant or magnaflux examination. It is recommended that 100% of these joints be examined.

### **7.7.2.4 Micro hardness test**

In order to control that the toughness of the pipe material is not affected by the welds, it is recommended to perform micro hardness tests as part of the weld procedure and weld operator testing and, by samples of production welds.

## 7.8 Documentation

The following documents relating to the construction and installation of the pipeline shall be retrieved and collected in a dossier that is retained for reference by the operator:

- Pressure test report
- Weld procedures, procedure qualifications, and qualification records for each welder.
- Weld joint NDE reports (Including rejects/repairs, weld map, weld operator identification, welding technique used).
- Summary of all NDE procedures demonstrating that all code, regulatory, and project specific requirements have been met.
- Report of internal pipe cleaning and inspection.
- Inspection reports for all inspection activities
- As-built drawings.
- As-built data logs.
- Records of construction personnel qualifications.
- Material control certificates.
- Other reports and certificates required by local and/or national authorities, the relevant piping code and the project specification.
- Protective coating integrity test report (report on pinholes or defects in the external coating)
- Cathodic protection and electrical isolation report.

At the completion of the work, the fabricator should supply a written statement that all NDE requirements have been met which has been executed by the quality assurance supervisor or other qualified individuals.

## 8 Design and construction of stations

### 8.1 Function

The function of a process control station is to control and meter gas in conjunction with a supply pipeline. Each process control station is designed and constructed for individual customer requirements and incorporates appropriate process control equipment. Typical arrangements are shown in Appendix A, Diagram 1.

The different functions may be : isolation for maintenance and/or for emergency, metering, pressure and/or flow regulation, filtration.

This type of station is typically located at a customer's site.

Additionally regulatory requirements may require isolation stations at defined intervals along the pipeline.

### 8.2 Design brief

A design brief summarising the basic requirements (Process Definition and P & I Diagram) should be used as the basis for design.

The design brief should be developed by reference to the following:

- process pattern data supplied by customer
- environmental, customer, and other statutory requirements
- site requirements, including interaction with surrounding plant, e.g. vent collection system.

A Hazop study and Risk Assessment shall be considered with the design brief.

An example of a complete process control station showing possible components is shown in Appendix A, Diagram 2.

### 8.2.1 Excess flow valves

Excess flow valves should be provided to afford protection against pipeline failures. The closure of the valves can be initiated manually or automatically from a central control room or by automatic signals derived from high flowrate, low pressure or rate of decay of line pressure.

### 8.2.2 Isolation valves

Due to the risks of toxicity and ignition of a carbon monoxide or Syngas leakage, maintenance should be done after positive isolation of the concerned installation, followed by inerting. Positive isolation may be done by double block and bleed valves, blind flange, double trunnion mounted ball valve equipped with a body vent or equivalent.

### 8.2.3 Filters and strainers

Filters may be installed at the inlet to the process control station to protect control devices from particulate matter (originating from the upstream carbon steel pipeline or equipment/machinery) which may be entrained in the gas stream.

### 8.2.4 Flow meters

The billing quality meter measures accurately the total quantity of gas passing through the process control station. The meter consists of a primary device and instrumentation to convert the process variables to a volumetric or mass flow value.

A bypass is recommended to facilitate removal for calibration and maintenance.

The selection of flow meter type is normally based on the accuracy requirements for the required range of gas flow to meet customer requirements. Instrumentation comprised of pressure, differential pressure and temperature transmitters measure and convert the process variables into signals that are typically input into a flow computer. The flow computer uses these inputs to calculate a flow rate which is integrated over a specific time period to calculate and record volumes.

### 8.2.5 Flow and pressure control

Flow control devices are typically provided to overcome erratic flow patterns to produce constant supply irrespective of customer demand, or to limit the flow available to the customer. Pressure control systems regulate the variable pipeline pressure to deliver gas at constant pressure to the customer.

Installed block and manual by-pass valves are the recommended minimum scope to achieve reliable supply and provide for ease of maintenance. In some cases it may be preferable to consider a redundant control valve instead of the manual by-pass for even higher reliability.

### 8.2.6 Gas storage

Storage vessels or additional volume of piping may be required to provide buffer capacity to satisfy peaks in customer demand and to provide downstream capacity to facilitate efficient control valve operation.

Due to the risk of toxicity in case of leak, gas storage vessels should be avoided.

When used, their risks must be taken into account in the pipeline system risk assessment. The materials of construction of these storage vessels should as a minimum follow the pipeline requirements in intent and selection criteria. Vessels should be designed with sufficient parent metal and weld zone toughness for leak before break criterion and to withstand fatigue in service.

### 8.2.7 Pressure relief

In order of preference based on fail safe design, the following provisions are recommended:

- The entire station should be designed for the MAWP of the pipeline to avoid the need for pressure relief valves to protect the station from over pressure.
- Where this is not practical, then safety valves safely vented to a closed collection system are recommended.

- Where a vent collection system is not readily available to tie into, an automatic shutoff system, the use of two automatic isolation valves in series controlled by triple redundant pressure transmitters with two out of three voting or a rupture pin system should be considered.
- These systems may require a small pressure relief valve downstream of this device, as it is assumed that all valves leak through. Either systems must meet applicable codes requirements. The shutoff valve and control system should be given a functional test.

### **8.2.8 Instruments**

Instruments are usually electric, electronic, pneumatic, or a combination of these types of systems. The instrument and control system should be designed to fail safe electrically and pneumatically unless the customer desires a fail in place system for higher reliability. The pipeline supplier should consider the advantages and risks to this less fail-safe but more reliable arrangement before agreeing. In any case it is recommended that written instructions be received from the customer before proceeding.

### **8.2.9 Electrical**

See section 5.2 above.

Part or all of the station is classified as a hazardous electrical area and the equipment and installation must conform to the relevant code requirements.

The equipment and piping shall be electrically connected and grounded to drain static electricity and to carry electrical fault currents to earth ground, to prevent release of electric sparks which could ignite hydrogen leaks in the area.

## **8.3 Standards and design codes**

Design, fabrication, inspection, examination and testing shall be in accordance with national or international standards, such as ASME B31.3 and B31.8.

Electrical and instrument installations shall be designed and installed in accordance with the relevant international or national standards for the electrical hazardous area classification.

## **8.4 Materials and fabrication**

Fabrication shall be carried out by contractors approved in their particular discipline, i.e. Mechanical, Civil, Electrical, Instruments. Installation work shall be completed in accordance with the design drawings and specifications. The completed work should be inspected and approved by the relevant technical authority.

## **8.5 Access limitation**

Each station should be enclosed within a clearly marked area with signs indicating the risk and the necessary emergency response.

When a station is located in a public area, a fence which does not inhibit free air flow should enclose the station to prevent unauthorized access. The enclosure should have at least 2 gates and be lockable. Exits should open outwards into areas that are free of obstructions.

When a station is located on a plant site, then a chain instead of a fence may be considered sufficient in some cases.

## **8.6 Location**

The location and the design of the station should be made according to the results of a toxicity analysis.

Due to toxicity risk, a careful analysis of the installation must be done to ensure that safe entry is provided for operators both in the design and in operating procedures. Monitoring the atmosphere at different places in the enclosure and the design of ventilation systems are important topics to be

included in the analysis. It is worth noting that locating a station indoors may, and locating one in a pit always, require more stringent hazardous electrical designs.

When selecting a location, it is preferable to have significant clear space around the enclosure. This may not always be practical. Some examples of good siting practice are given in Appendix E.

Piping may be installed on a concrete slab and the station should be surrounded by a fence. The fence, of a height of at least 2 m, will be provided with at least two emergency escape doors in opposite sides.

Valves may also be installed below ground, if there are security concerns.

Activities involving the use or production of flames, sparks or other ignition sources are forbidden within the enclosure or the distance requirements of the applicable codes, whichever is greater, except as authorised by a safety work permit.

An acceptable standard of lighting shall be provided to illuminate the station, when this is deemed necessary to ensure personnel safety. The lighting fixtures and installation must conform to the code requirements for the hazardous electrical area.

## **8.7 Grounding**

The resistance to earth (or ground) of the station pipework should not exceed 10 ohms at any point throughout the installation; tests shall be conducted from a known earth point. If necessary cross flange bonding may be required to achieve the stated minimum value. If cross bonding has been adopted, measures shall be taken to prevent corrosion of component parts.

Pipework systems should not be used as grounding rods. Each piece of equipment should be individually earthed.

All grounding should be to a common grounding grid to ensure that all items, including the pipe work, are brought to a common electrical potential.

All test results including reference earth point shall be recorded and periodic testing undertaken.

## **8.8 Installation**

Installation shall be carried out by contractors approved in their particular discipline, i.e. Mechanical, Civil, Electrical, Instruments. Installation work shall be completed in accordance with the design drawings and specifications. The completed installation should be inspected and approved by the relevant technical authority.

## **8.9 Pressure and leak testing**

Pressure testing to meet code requirements is required. Usually the station is tested separately from the pipeline. This may take place either at a fabricator or in the field. If hydrostatic testing is used, the piping shall be thoroughly drained, dried and cleaned after testing.

Pneumatic leak testing is also required. This may take place either at a fabricator or in the field or preferably both. Inerting the pipeline is sometimes combined with the leak test. As nitrogen is used as the test / inerting gas, precautions against asphyxiation shall be specified. Vent pipes should be fitted, where necessary, to ensure that gas is discharged to a safe area.

## **8.10 Commissioning**

The preparation of a suitable commissioning procedure should be undertaken with details of the following accommodated:

- interaction with customer processes
- safety considerations

A knowledgeable and experienced person shall be appointed to control all aspects of the commissioning procedure.

#### **8.10.1 Safety**

Only authorised personnel should be allowed in the vicinity of the station during commissioning. The person responsible for the co-ordination and control of the commissioning shall ensure that the Customer and all personnel are properly briefed. Normally a commissioning programme and procedure will be prepared and discussed with all concerned before commissioning starts. All Gas Supplier and Customer standing orders and safety instructions shall be observed.

#### **8.10.2 Pre-commissioning checks**

The commissioning procedure should start after satisfactory completion of pressure testing and the issue of the relevant test certificates. The procedure should include the following pre-commissioning checks:

- P & I D is compared and verified with the new station equipment and piping
- relevant material, cleaning, authenticated calibration and test certificates are available
- warning notices and instruction plates are posted
- filter elements are fitted, if and where specified
- satisfactory operation and adjustment of:
  - meters
  - flow Controllers
  - spill valves
  - pressure controllers
  - safety valves (if fitted)
  - safety shut-off valves (if fitted)
  - shut-off valves
  - safety devices, alarms and trips
  - all automatic actions and responses
- Verification of meter installation and calibration by a customer's representative is frequently required.

#### **8.10.3 Inerting**

Inerting of stations may be performed by the method of successive pressurizations and depressurizations (pressure pumping) since the stations invariably have undrained cavities (dead legs, hands). A minimum of three cycles of pressurization and depressurization must be performed. Verifying that the inerting is complete by local analysis is suggested. Inerting may also be done including piping and stations by simply flowing nitrogen through the system, see 8.10.4.

During commissioning the filter differential pressure gauges should be monitored, especially in the first phases of commissioning, in order to detect when filter element changes are required. Such a monitoring exercise should also be carried out following maintenance / shutdown operations.

#### **8.10.4 Pre-commissioning checks of the whole pipeline system**

When pipeline and stations have been inerted, the oxygen content must be measured to ensure that there is no more air or oxygen in the pipeline. Then hydrogen can be introduced into the pipeline system until all nitrogen has been displaced. Hydrogen pressure is increased step by step and checked to be at a stable level. During that process, flanges and mechanical joints, which could not be previously tested, are checked for leaks using for example an explosimeter.

### **8.11 Operation**

Process control stations are normally automatic in operation once the controls have been set. The only manual operations required are:

- Opening and closing of isolating valves to suit process and maintenance requirements
- Monitoring of gauges and other indicator displays to ensure the process control station or components are operating within limits
- Maintenance of a clean process control station area and particularly the exclusion of flammable products
- Implementation of a maintenance programme

Personnel entrusted with the operation of the process control station shall have been trained in the operating techniques required, the potential hazards associated with carbon monoxide and Syngas and in the emergency procedures.

#### **8.11.1 Filters / screens**

Initially on a new station, due to high velocity test and purge flowrates during commissioning, any filters may receive a considerable amount of foreign matter from the pipeline and may choke rapidly. Therefore, after a short time in operation, the filter / screen differential pressure should be checked and the filter / screen cleaned if necessary. Depending on the degree of cleanliness of the pipeline and station piping, it may be necessary to repeat this process.

### **9 Operation and monitoring**

#### **9.1 Operation and maintenance manual**

An Operations and Maintenance Manual is required for the operation all CO, and Syngas pipelines. The operator shall provide all information needed for safe operation of the pipeline in the form of rules, guidelines, and procedures within this document.

The pipeline system can be influenced by the reliability of the individual components and the experience and training of the operations personnel. In order to meet these performance standards the following precautions and provisions shall be considered:

- Ensure safe operation of the pipeline system
- Monitor its condition
- Perform maintenance safely and effectively
- Deal effectively and responsibly with incidents and emergencies

#### **9.2 Management systems**

A management system shall be established and implemented with the objectives of insuring the following:

- Safe operation of the pipeline system
- Compliance with design
- Managing pipeline integrity
- Safe and effective execution of maintenance, modifications and abandonment
- Dealing effectively with incidents and emergencies

The management system should include the following:

- Identification of personnel responsible for the management of the operation and maintenance of the pipeline and for key activities
- An appropriate organization chart
- A written plan covering operation and maintenance procedures
- A written emergency response plan, covering failure of pipeline systems and other incidents
- A written work permit system
- A written Management of Change Process
- A written operator training and qualification programme
- A periodic review and update process
- Effective pipeline integrity management system



### 9.3 General safety requirements

When performing work on a CO or Syngas system the following will be required:

- Smoking and other sources of ignition are forbidden in stations and within a minimum distance of 5 meters
- Personal protective equipment including flame retardant clothing
- Use of non sparking tools
- Work permit required when performing maintenance and/or repairs
- Positive isolation is required prior to performing maintenance and/or repairs. It should request the presence of minimum two persons, when there is work which may involve a release of gas
- Proper purging and inerting required prior to any welding or cutting
- Fire watch required when performing welding or cutting.
- Temporary grounding is recommended during maintenance and/or repair
- Gas detection and monitoring required prior to and while performing work on a CO or Syngas system.
- Standby Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) required in the immediate work area when performing work on a CO or Syngas system.
- CO gas detection monitoring badge must be worn by all personnel
- Venting to a flare system is required when purging of a CO or Syngas system.

### 9.4 Personnel for operation and maintenance

As well as having the usual work safety knowledge, personnel who operate, maintain and repair CO or Syngas systems must also have special knowledge of how to handle CO or Syngas and the potential hazards that are involved. They must be well acquainted with the location of the pipelines, the stations and the control equipment. All the operating and safety procedures must be available to the personnel.

All personnel including Sub-contractors must be made aware of any abnormal operating conditions and have access to all the relevant safety information.

### 9.5 Welding and cutting

#### 9.5.1 In service welding and cutting

Any welding on in-service CO or Syngas pipelines could cause localized heating and/or adversely affect the integrity of the piping system and therefore shall be avoided.

The only exceptions are:

- drilling small openings in depressurised pipelines during connection work
- welding on cathodic protection devices

The above work requires special equipment and procedures; it may only be carried out under the supervision of highly experienced and trained personnel. The process qualification should verify that the pipe metallurgy and properties are not adversely affected by the process. Although it is preferred that these processes be done when the line is out of service, it is recognized that occasions may arise when this is not practical, but these should be minimized.

#### 9.5.2 Out of service welding and cutting

All maintenance welding of CO or Syngas pipelines shall be to the same standards and requirements called for in the construction section above. A weld that cannot be repaired as outlined above may be repaired by installing a full encirclement welded split sleeve using circumferential fillet welds or cutting out and replacing that section of pipe.

If a segment of a pipeline is repaired by cutting out the damaged portion of the pipe as a cylinder, the removed section should be cut at least two pipe diameters on each side of the defect or weld. The replacement pipe must be of comparable strength and metallurgy and be suitable for the CO or Syngas service at the intended maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP). The replacement section of pipe must be pre-tested to match the MAWP of the pipeline. All field girth butt welds not strength tested must be radiographically examined after installation.

Cold cutting of pipelines for tie-in and repairs is preferred to reduce the possibility of ignition keeping in mind that this does not reduce any of the requirements for safe maintenance activities.

## **9.6 Shut down, repair and start up of pipelines**

A hazardous work permit is generally required for shut down, repair and start up and maintenance of pipelines. The personnel involved in the work, including contractors, must be qualified and be informed of the abnormal operating conditions related to CO or Syngas and the tasks to be performed.

A positive shut-off is required. This shut off can be carried out by:

- Complete disconnection of the section concerned from the pipeline system
- Installing blind flanges
- Closure and mechanical locking of two valves arranged in tandem with an open venting valve between them (if the valve has an electric drive, the power should also be disconnected) : or a double trunnion mounted ball valve equipped with a body vent.

A check valve cannot be used as a shut-off mechanism for maintenance work.

Inerting of the section of pipe to be repaired, which should include local analysis, must be done prior to the start of any work.

Lock out and tag out procedures shall be used to indicate that the equipment has been placed in the shut off position and to reduce the risk of uncontrolled operation of the valves. Operations must inform the maintenance team that the pipeline is ready for their work.

## **9.7 Venting and pressure relief**

### **9.7.1 Venting:**

Small quantities of CO or syngas may be vented to the atmosphere in a safe location and maintaining a high upwards velocity, to facilitate dispersion, eventually by adding nitrogen.

Large quantities of CO or syngas shall be directed to a flare system (permanent or mobile).

In case of emergency, when large quantities of CO or syngas must be vented to atmosphere, the vent must be carried out to a stack in order to be directed away from personnel, buildings and enclosures, in a location where neither personnel nor vulnerable items of equipment are exposed to CO or syngas. It should be assumed that the vent flow may ignite, in which case radiation criteria in Section 4.6.7 should not be exceeded. Venting should not take place directly beneath any overhead power or communication lines.

### **9.7.2 Purging**

Purging of CO or syngas, except for relatively small quantities, requires the use of a flare system. The flare system must be purged of air before the introduction of the CO/Syngas, to avoid ignition inside the piping.

Nitrogen or other inert gas must be used to purge CO or Syngas from the pipeline before loosening or disconnecting flanges, instruments, etc. Dead ended legs of the pipeline system that cannot be swept by nitrogen must be pressure purged. The number of pressure purging cycles must be evaluated for each specific job.

A written purging plan should be prepared that insures all CO or Syngas is removed from the pipeline system to non-detectable levels.

When using nitrogen, it must be ensured that unauthorised access to the outlet is prevented and that no-one can be endangered by oxygen deficient atmospheres.

### **9.7.3 Maintenance and repair**

Maintenance and repair work should not be accomplished whenever CO or syngas is present in the ambient air.

## **9.8 Commissioning pipelines and stations**

After the successful mechanical completion of the installation, repair or maintenance work, including all testing, cleaning and drying, the pipeline is ready for commissioning. The maintenance team

should inform operations of the completion of the work and that the system is ready for recommissioning.

The steps in commissioning the pipeline are:

- Remove any blind flanges.
- Flow and pressure purge the pipeline with nitrogen until all air is removed and verify by analysis
- Introduce CO or Syngas and vent
- Pressure purge any dead-ended legs with CO or Syngas
- Test for required purity of CO or Syngas.
- Close off all vent and purge valves
- Pressurize system to operating pressure
- Leak check all valves, flanges, and fittings.

When commissioning starts, the pipeline must first be purged with CO or syngas so that the nitrogen that is already in the pipe is removed. The purging process is carried out using throttling and bypass valves, if present (depending on the nominal diameter of the pipeline) via the last valve under pressure. The CO or Syngas should be introduced in a specific direction in order to ensure CO or Syngas purity. All flow purging should be done at low pressure as a safety precaution.

The purity of the CO or Syngas should be measured at all outlets using analysis equipment. If the purity, as required by the customer specifications, is adequate at the outlet, the relevant valve can be closed.

When the pipeline has been purged and all the purging points have been closed, the pipeline can be pressurised, using a by-pass, a throttling valve or a control valve in order to slowly pressurise the pipe up to the operating pressure.

All mechanical connections such as flanges, valve bonnets, threaded couplings, etc should be checked for leaks at regular intervals during commissioning.

## **9.9 Operation and monitoring**

Supplier's and manufacturer's instructions for the equipment and systems shall be followed as received from the supplier or as upgraded by an authorized person in the operating company. Pipeline and stations must be kept in good working order from an operational and safety point of view. The operator shall follow a defined maintenance programme, including all safety and technical monitoring measures. A detailed description of the work to be carried out should be documented by outlining specific tasks that are routinely used for pipeline maintenance.

An example of a preventive maintenance programme can be seen in Appendix F, which illustrates the main tasks to be performed. The frequency at which inspections are performed will be dictated by national regulations and/ or established company practices.

## **9.10 Information to third parties, work adjacent to pipelines and update of documents**

### **9.10.1 General**

The maintenance of pipelines does not concern just technical and operational considerations.

Statistics from pipeline companies show that more than two accidents out of three occurring on underground pipelines are due to external events.

To protect pipelines and ensure the reliability of supply, it is necessary that third parties be informed of the location of the pipelines, any work adjacent to the pipelines and information regarding the installation of new pipelines.

### **9.10.2 Flow of information**

National regulations, when they exist, must be followed.

These regulations typically require:

- That operators of underground structures (pipes, cables, etc.) submit a declaration to the local authorities concerned.

- That contractors performing earthworks in the area of underground structures inform the operators of those underground structures, in the form of a declaration, about the nature of such work prior to starting any work.
- That operators respond to the contractors in timely manner.
- That operators have a qualified inspector present during any third party earthworks over, adjacent to or under its underground structures at all times while the work is being performed.

In absence of national regulations, a similar plan for information flow should be adopted.

### **9.10.3 Summary of work**

A summary of work carried out on pipelines or near pipelines and also of work not performed should be made by the pipeline operator.

When work is performed adjacent to pipelines, the summary should be formalised by the issue of a written document countersigned by the site manager.

### **9.10.4 Records**

Records of the following should be made by the pipeline operator:

- requests from contractors
- replies to those requests, with the transmitted documents, including preferably GPS coordinates of the work
- work supervision documentation

### **9.10.5 Updating of pipeline drawings**

Updating of pipeline documents, in particular pipe installation drawings or maps, should be carried out on existing pipelines to reflect deviations and modifications which occurred when work was performed.

## **9.11 Specialised surveys**

In addition to the routine monitoring of cathodic protection system potentials, consideration should be given to investigating the integrity of the pipeline coating system and other faults, which may reduce the effectiveness of the cathodic protection (C.P) system.

This can be achieved by the use of specialised survey techniques, such as.

- Pearson survey.
- Current attenuation survey.
- Close interval potential survey.
- Direct current voltage gradient.

These investigations can be undertaken at 5 to 10 year intervals, depending on the particular pipeline and the type of cathodic protection system applied. It is common practice to compare the results of such surveys with those obtained immediately following installation. For reference, see NACE RP 0502.

## **9.12 Damage to the pipeline system**

### **9.12.1 Leakage**

It is essential that all leaks be quickly identified so that proper remediation can take place. If a leakage of product from the pipeline is suspected, and cannot be located through visual, audible or analytical evidence, it may be necessary to isolate the pipeline in sections and pressure test it to identify the source of the leak or prove that the pipeline is sound.

Another method of locating small leaks is to use sophisticated detection equipment that can identify minute amounts of inert substances known as tracer compounds that are injected into the pipeline.

### **9.12.2 Other defects**

Other defects can be coating defects, dents, gouges, welding arc strikes, pits, cracks and corrosion damages to the pipe. These defects must be evaluated to define the proper type of repair, replacement or reinforcement of the damaged piping and remediated as required.

Coating defects may not need to be repaired, if they do not compromise the efficiency of the cathodic protection.

It is important to capture the geographic coordinates of the damages to the pipe and trace the repairs.

### **9.12.3 Detection of defects**

Various methods can be used to detect defects as caused by the many different types of threats to a pipeline. Some of the assessment methods include in-line inspection, pressure testing, and types of direct assessment. The process of determining and assessing defects is defined in ASME B31.8S, titled, "Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines".

### **9.12.4 Revalidation**

Consideration should be given to revalidation (a detailed inspection, including a pressure test) to establish the pipeline's suitability for continued service after an incident occurs which may call this into question. Typical of such incidents are leakage, fire or other significant incident, not attributable to third party interference. Similarly a significant modification to the pipeline system may suggest comparable action.

## **10 General protective measures**

### **10.1 Emergency response plan**

An emergency procedure document enables all operating staff and others, who may be involved, including the public authorities, to be adequately informed of the action to be taken in the event of an emergency. Procedures should be developed to meet the particular needs of each individual pipeline system. National laws or regulations may dictate the form and content of such a procedure, however, even if no regulation exists, it is strongly recommended that an emergency response plan be developed by the operator. The following is a typical list of subjects issued as a guide to be considered when compiling such procedures.

#### **10.1.1 Liaison with public authorities and other consultees**

The effective handling of a pipeline incident will often require the co-operation of public authorities (e.g. Police, Fire, Public Utilities etc.). A list of emergency contacts should be established and copies of the relevant sections of the emergency procedure should be circulated to those authorities that may be involved.

#### **10.1.2 Description of pipeline system**

This should include all relevant technical data such as routing, length, diameter, pressure of the pipeline, location, drawings of control stations including location of isolating valves.

#### **10.1.3 Control centres**

It is recommended that a single designated group or individual be responsible to control activities during an emergency. The role and location of the control centre for dealing with an emergency should be established and communication media (e.g. telephone, radio, e-mail and/or fax) should be identified. Clear instructions for dealing with emergencies should be formally established and generally available.

#### **10.1.4 Notification of an incident**

The incident may be detected by operators at a pipeline control centre or be notified by a third party through the observation of some abnormal condition on site. The control centre should be responsible for identifying the precise location of the incident, recording all details and passing the information to the emergency response team without delay. Notification should include the appropriate authorities responsible for public safety such as fire, police and transportation authorities.

#### **10.1.5 Alerting procedure**

It is the responsibility of the control centre to alert the engineer and personnel on call. The emergency procedure should clearly identify the initial action to be taken by all personnel on receiving an emergency call. Any restrictions on entering land should be included. Provision shall be made for the mobilisation of a responsible person at the site together with staff capable of assessing and dealing with the scale of the operation.

The alerting procedure should include a clearly defined safety perimeter around the incident centre into which no unauthorized persons may enter.

The alerting procedure should also include requirements to inform all concerned when normal conditions are restored.

#### **10.1.6 Shutting down a pipeline**

A clear procedure and understanding with the public authorities regarding the isolation and shutdown of the pipeline in an emergency situation should be established. It is recommended that the pipeline control centre take charge of these events in the interests of the safety of all involved.

#### **10.1.7 Emergency equipment**

Equipment to deal with the emergency must be kept in a state of readiness at an appropriate location. Typical examples are transportation for equipment and manpower, effective communication system between control centres and the incident location, analysis equipment, fire extinguishers, protective clothing and safety devices, escape masks and self contained breathing apparatus, lighting sets and power supply, repair materials and tools.

#### **10.1.8 Remedial action**

A detailed assessment of the action to be taken in dealing with the emergency can only be established following an initial assessment at the site.

However general guidelines on the approach to be taken for the more likely and dangerous situations should be indicated in the procedure, e.g. steps to be taken in dealing with an incident.

Annual reviews of emergency response plans with local authorities is often a mandated requirement and is considered a good practice in any event.

#### **10.1.9 Pipelines with cathodic protection**

If a pipeline has been severed, the cathodic protection system should be isolated and temporary bonds established if required.

#### **10.1.10 Incident report form**

Details of the incident should be written down and maintained in the files of the operator. They should be compiled and recorded on the form required by the legislative requirements of the country concerned and/or the company reporting procedure. The geographic co-ordinates (GPS) of the incident may be also recorded.

#### **10.1.11 Emergency drills**

To ensure that the emergency procedure adequately covers the requirements of the pipeline system for which it is drawn up and to provide practice situations for personnel, it is recommended that emergency drills be carried out periodically.

## 10.2 Accident and damage report

If a pipeline accident occurs a thorough investigation should take place and a clear and concise report issued. The report should contain an accurate description of the conditions which pertained during the last minutes before the accident, the material involved and the consequences of the accident, such as a secondary ignition, injury to people and damage to equipment or property. It is a recommended practice that for serious incidents, a Root Cause Analysis be conducted in order to determine what should be changed to prevent a similar occurrence.

## 10.3 Safety management system

Consideration should be given to establishing a specialised form of safety management system, commonly referred to as a Pipeline Integrity Management System (P.I.M.S.). Such a system enables formal control of key aspects of safety management to be established and demonstrated.

An effective system typically provides detailed information, specific to the particular pipeline to cover the following subject headings.

### 10.3.1 Notification to authorities and consultation on routing

These are normally stipulated in the prevailing legislation and rules applying to the country the pipeline is to be installed in.

### 10.3.2 Design and construction

Overall design and construction practice is dictated by the relevant design standards, codes of practice and specifications acknowledged in the country concerned. In addition to these, industry and/or company standards and specifications which relate to the particular product to be transmitted are applied

### 10.3.3 Shutdown systems

Shutdown may be manual or automatic. Shutdown devices (e.g. emergency shutoff valves) may be actuated by a leak detection system or by sensing high flow, low pressure, or rate of decay of line pressure.

### 10.3.4 Operations

A control strategy is devised to control the pipeline supply within safe operating parameters. Variables incorporated into the control strategy may include

- Pressure: to ensure that the required delivery pressure from the pipeline is maintained. Protection against excess pressure is generally not an issue, since pipelines are normally designed to withstand pressures in excess of the maximum that can be developed by the production unit. A suitable pressure relief device may be required upstream of the pipeline to provide protection against overpressure beyond the design criteria.
- Temperature: to ensure that cryogenic liquids from the storage units do not enter the pipeline system.
- Flow: to match customer demand by product flow into the pipeline.
- Product purity: to ensure any product which does not meet specification does not enter the pipeline system.

Any product disposal needed to maintain the required pipeline conditions is preferably achieved through controlled venting on the production site.

### 10.3.5 Control of third party interference

Measures typically employed are :

- Marker posts on the pipeline route.
- Distribution of “as built” drawings and information on the pipeline route to landowners, local authority planners, and other interested parties.
- Similar information is also distributed to “one call” systems, a single point of contact where information on all pipelines and services can be obtained - (where applicable).
- Scheduled patrols of the pipeline by foot or aerial survey to search for unauthorised interference and to identify abnormal conditions. (See also 10.6.10).

### **10.3.6 Maintenance and inspection**

A planned maintenance and remediation system (including routine patrols of the pipeline) is recommended.

Examples of typical tasks included in such programmes listed as illustrations for guidance are:

- routine testing of cathodic protection system
- visual leak check on above-ground flanges
- visual check for signs of unauthorised interference with the pipeline system
- visual check for signs of land subsidence
- visual check for any accidental damage to the system
- visual check for any development activities in the vicinity of the pipeline
- check that all pipeline marking devices are in place
- visual checks for dead or burned vegetation
- visual checks for bubbling

### **10.3.7 Major accident prevention policies and safety management systems**

A document detailing the organisation and personnel, hazard identification and evaluation, operational control, management of change, planning for emergencies, monitoring performance, audit/review may be prepared (dependent upon the perceived extent and nature of the major accident hazards presented by the pipeline and local regulations and practice).

### **10.3.8 Emergency planning**

An emergency plan is prepared so that any incident can receive effective response. This plan is specific to the parent site(s), and defines the roles of local personnel in an emergency situation. It also identifies any emergency contacts, both internal and external to the operating company. The plan is structured to be locally self-sufficient.

Personnel who could be called on to deal with an incident shall receive training appropriate to their role in such an event. Any special protective clothing and equipment that might be required is kept readily accessible and is maintained in a fit condition for use.

### **10.3.9 Information to the public and interested parties**

Plans and documentation illustrating the route of the pipeline should be sent to the local government authority planning department, landowners and other parties who may have an interest in the pipeline (e.g. railway, mining authorities, road authorities, fire and police departments.) Where appropriate, information is also provided to the public by means of marker posts along the route of the pipeline; see also section 4.5.

### **10.3.10 Land use planning**

The pipeline operator can exercise some control over the land area defined by his /easement agreement. Land outside the limits of this “right of way” is not however controlled by the pipeline operator. Although adjacent property is not controlled by the pipeline operator, this does not relieve him of the responsibility to attempt to be familiar with and if practical to monitor the activities and risks associated with the activities on and the uses of the abutting properties. In other words the operator should be a concerned neighbour.



**10.3.11 Accident reporting**


This is normally included in the legislative requirements of individual Member States or local authorities.

**10.4 Leak detection system (LDS)**

When operating a CO or Syngas pipeline equipped with a Leak Detection System it is important to check periodically the awareness of the system.


Any change of the piping system will require a new validation of the LDS.

## Appendix A: Typical arrangements for pipelines systems



**Diagram 1 : Typical transmission and distribution piping systems**

Note: the transmission pipeline system includes the metering/control station at the production plant, the pipeline itself and related equipment and the control/metering stations at customer site.



**Diagram 2: Typical arrangement for a CO isolation and metering station**

## **Appendix B: Embrittlement and environmental damage mechanisms involving Syngas, Carbon Monoxide mixtures; applicable test methods**

### **B1. Introduction**

In dealing with Syngas and carbon monoxide atmospheres, consideration must be given to embrittlement and degradation mechanisms related to the hydrogen presence and those associated with carbon monoxide. There are a number of mechanisms involving hydrogen which have caused embrittlement or damage to engineering alloys. Some of these may be of concern in pipelines used for the transmission of Syngas and the others are not. A brief description of the mechanisms which fall into the two categories follows. In addition, there is a brittle fracture mechanism known as stress corrosion cracking which is of concern to Syngas and carbon monoxide pipelines but it does not necessarily involve hydrogen in the embrittlement process. This embrittlement mode may affect the exterior surfaces of pipelines. Particular to carbon monoxide pipelines, there is another stress corrosion mechanism specific to carbon monoxide and its mixtures. Brief descriptions of the stress corrosion mechanisms also follow.

### **B2. Embrittlement or environmental Damage Mechanisms Pertinent to Syngas and Carbon Monoxide Pipelines**

#### **B2.1 Hydrogen gas embrittlement**

Hydrogen Gas Embrittlement (HGE) is the generic term which encompasses all of the detrimental effects which engineering alloys might experience in hydrogen gas or hydrogen gas mixtures at ambient temperatures. Some of the effects are more serious than others. Materials variables and actual service conditions will have an effect on the appearance of the various HGE modes.

A number of test methods are available to evaluate the suitability of material to resist hydrogen gas embrittlement (see ISO 11114-4 and B4 below), some make use of fracture mechanics specimens, others of tensile test or disk specimens.

In general, the degradation of the mechanical properties of materials is greatest when the strain rate is low and the hydrogen pressure and purity is high. Under the conditions most appropriate to the operation of a hydrogen gas transmission pipeline, it is generally believed to be true that the gas is dry. Fatigue is not supposed to be a problem and species which contribute to environmental aggressiveness are not supposed to be present. Nevertheless, the following have been selected as most likely to be of concern in Syngas pipelines:

##### **B2.1.1 Hydrogen stress cracking (HSC)**

Hydrogen stress cracking describes a phenomenon which resembles stress corrosion cracking but occurs in hydrogen gas. In the presence of hydrogen gas (or another gas bearing hydrogen) a material can become brittle and may fail if the stress level is too high. This phenomenon is optimum around room temperature for usual metallic materials such as ferritic steels. It does not apply for steels above 150 °C but could then be replaced at high temperature by "hydrogen attack" (see reference Interaction of steels with Hydrogen in petroleum industry pressure vessel service, Paris 89). It also tends to be negligible at cryogenic temperature except for some unstable austenitic stainless steels.

If "precracked" fracture toughness tests of selected materials are compared in an inert atmosphere vs an embrittling agent such as hydrogen, susceptible materials will show a reduction in the fracture toughness parameter in environments such as hydrogen. The extent of the property loss is a function of alloy and environmental factors. The major benefit of such tests and results is that analytical techniques exist for determining critical flaw sizes in engineering structures which can be detected via NDT techniques. For a given alloy and environment, a critical stress intensity (typically called  $K_H$ ) can be determined below which hydrogen induced crack growth will not occur. Another benefit of such data is that it can be used to identify the conditions under which "leak before break" fracture will exist

vs catastrophic running fractures. The other test methods define sometimes a maximum embrittlement index for the acceptance of materials.

Non-destructive inspection techniques can be used to determine if unacceptable flaws are present. Local imperfections can act as a stress raiser.

Susceptible materials may, in presence of tensile stresses either residual or directly applied, develop cracks in hydrogen gas environments. Material variables which affect the susceptibility of engineering alloys include alloy chemistry, microstructure, hardness and strength level. Hydrogen variables at ambient temperature which are significant include impurities and pressure.

Manufacturing or heat treatment procedures which eliminate residual tensile stresses, mitigate HSC. In the case of carbon or low alloy steels such treatments may soften weld heat affected zones and temper martensite which may be present in such areas. Prudent alloy selection including the specification of maximum strength levels or alloy heat treatment can be used to eliminate or mitigate the problem.

It should be noted that certain nickel alloys may be subject to this phenomenon.

Hydrogen stress cracking is characterized by the brittle fracture of a normally ductile alloy under sustained load in the presence of hydrogen. Most often, fracture occurs at sustained loads below the yield strength of the material. This cracking mechanism depends on the hydrogen fugacity, strength level of the material, heat treatment/microstructure, applied stress, and temperature. For many steels, a threshold stress exists below which hydrogen stress cracking does not occur. This threshold is a function of the strength level of the steel and the specific hydrogen-bearing environment. Therefore, threshold stress or stress intensity for hydrogen stress cracking is not considered a material property. Generally, the threshold stress decreases as the yield strength and tensile strength of an alloy increase. Hydrogen stress cracking is associated with absorption of hydrogen and a delayed time to failure (incubation time) during which hydrogen diffuses into regions of high triaxial stress. Hydrogen stress cracking may promote one mode of fracture in an alloy rather than another form normally observed in benign environments. Thus, all modes of cracking have been observed in most commercial alloy systems; however, hydrogen stress cracking usually produces sharp singular cracks in contrast to the extensive branching observed in HSC.

#### B2.1.2 Reduction of tensile ductility and notched tensile strength in hydrogen gas

Hydrogen gas will reduce the tensile strength/ductility and notched tensile strength of susceptible materials in high pressure environments. The effect can be determined by conducting tensile tests of candidate materials in dry air or inert gas comparing the results of similar tests conducted in a hydrogen environment. Premature failures of burst discs have been attributed to this phenomenon.

#### B2.1.3 Accelerated fatigue cracking growth in hydrogen gas and hydrogen environments

Acceleration of fatigue crack growth and degradation in fatigue endurance limits have been observed in tests of susceptible materials via both pre-cracked specimens and smooth specimens in dry hydrogen gas environments. Carbon and low alloy steels show such degradation even at relatively low pressures in hydrogen gas. This is a mechanism which should be considered, preferably avoided if possible, in such applications. Since pipelines normally operate at near constant pressure, fatigue cracking is usually not a concern.

Tests have been conducted at pressures up to 45 MPa (7000 psig) under both static and dynamic conditions. Stable austenitic stainless steels generally show little environmental damage in such tests. However susceptible materials including metastable austenitic stainless steels, ferritic stainless steels, martensitic stainless steels and carbon/low alloy steels show some degradation in tensile strength ductility and notch tensile strength, this effect being dependent upon alloy strength level, heat treatment and hydrogen pressure.

Acceleration of fatigue crack growth and degradation in fatigue endurance limits have been observed in tests of susceptible materials via both pre-cracked specimens and smooth specimens in dry hydrogen gas environments. Carbon and low alloy steels show such degradation even at relatively low pressures in hydrogen gas. The accelerated fatigue crack growth is more pronounced at ambient temperatures and becomes less severe at elevated temperatures. The presence of hydrogen reduces

the threshold cyclic stress intensity factor ( $\Delta K_{th}$ ) as well as fatigue life. The degradation of fatigue properties is attributed to the reduction in crack tip ductility in presence of hydrogen. Despite the supposed absence of fatigue conditions in pipelines, fatigue may be a problem in some cases.

## B2.2 Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of line pipe steel in underground environments

Stress cracking of carbon/low alloy steel line pipe in underground environments from both anodic stress corrosion and/or hydrogen stress cracking mechanisms has been reported. This is usually an external corrosion phenomenon and is not influenced by the hydrogen gas being transported. The presence of residual or directly applied tensile stresses, the presence of a susceptible environment and susceptible metals are required for the mechanism. Factors which contribute to stress cracking, in addition to the preceding, may be hard spots, untempered martensite in weld areas, coating defects, microbiological activity and inadequate or improper cathodic protection schemes. Careful alloy selection, controlled alloy chemistries and controls over manufacturing processes will help mitigate this problem.

Stress corrosion cracking is an electrochemical process with distinct anodic and cathodic reactions. Corrosion specialists generally recognize true stress corrosion cracking as a mechanism in which cracking is controlled by the anodic reaction and consider cracking which is controlled by the cathodic reaction as a form of hydrogen embrittlement. Poor cathodic protection practices could contribute to the embrittlement mechanism. Outside of the laboratory, it may be difficult to discern the differences between the two cracking mechanisms.

## B2.3 Stress corrosion cracking in CO environments

It is generally accepted that stress corrosion cracking in CO environments is a true stress corrosion cracking process under anodic control. Hydrogen reactions do not play a role in crack initiation and propagation.

Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) requires the simultaneous presence of tensile stresses either residual or directly applied and a susceptible environment. The simultaneous presence of CO, traces of CO<sub>2</sub> and traces of H<sub>2</sub>O at temperatures below the dew point, will provide a susceptible environment for stress corrosion cracking in the use of carbon and low alloy steels. In pure CO environments, CO<sub>2</sub> and H<sub>2</sub>O species may under certain circumstances be present as contaminants.

Manufacturing or heat treatment procedures which reduce residual tensile stresses mitigate SCC. In this regard, post weld heat treatment (PWHT) is beneficial in reducing SCC susceptibility should liquid water be present. Cleaning, operational and component assembly procedures which minimize H<sub>2</sub>O and CO<sub>2</sub> presence are beneficial. Generally, CO SCC will not occur as long as the pipeline is dry.

## B2.4 Inhibiting effects of CO in H2 environments

It has been established that CO inhibits hydrogen embrittlement cracking. Other gas impurities including O<sub>2</sub>, CS<sub>2</sub>, and SO<sub>2</sub> also have an inhibiting effect. These gases are catalytic poisons that adsorb on the steel surface in preference to the hydrogen and poison the chemically active sites at which the hydrogen molecule dissociates into hydrogen atoms. It is the hydrogen atoms that dissolve into the metal and cause hydrogen embrittlement cracking,

The amount of CO needed to inhibit hydrogen embrittlement is not well established, but one reference indicates that cracking is inhibited at CO to H<sub>2</sub> ratio of 0.1, while other references suggest that less CO is effective. Most syngas compositions have CO / H<sub>2</sub> ratios much greater than 0.1 and are therefore unlikely to cause hydrogen embrittlement. Similarly, CO streams with small amounts of hydrogen will not promote hydrogen embrittlement.

Even though high CO concentrations are present, it is considered prudent to avoid the use of high strength steels and alloy steels (steels with tensile strength greater than 800 MPa). Generally, moderate strength steels are adequate for the pressure and structural requirements and will be resistant to hydrogen embrittlement should unplanned exposure to hydrogen gas occur.

## B2.5 Carbonyl formation

Iron and nickel carbonyls are formed by the action of carbon monoxide upon alloys that contain iron and nickel. The presence of iron and/or nickel carbonyl in process gases may have serious consequences. Literature data indicate that the attack upon pipe steels in gas mixture at moderate temperature (100-300 °C) is a function of alloy composition, surface condition, gas composition, gas flow rate, gas pressure and temperature with a maximum rate at about 200 °C. Generally, carbonyl formation reaction rates are low enough that pipeline structural integrity is not affected even after long term service.

## B3. Brittle fracture or damage mechanisms not pertinent to hydrogen or CO or Syngas pipelines

As a consequence of operating conditions such as elevated temperatures, specific contaminants not normally associated with hydrogen, CO or Syngas pipelines and the specificity of materials involved, there are brittle fracture or damage mechanisms which are not pertinent. A brief description of these follows:

### B3.1 Elevated temperature environmental effects on ferrous alloys

Hydrogen attack and decarburization are the two common damage mechanisms encountered by carbon or low alloy steels involving hydrogen at elevated temperatures. "Hydrogen attack" of a carbon steel or low alloy steel is a mode by which carbon reacts with hydrogen to form methane which results in crack formation. "Decarburization" of a carbon or low alloy steel may also occur in hydrogen atmospheres. Austenitic stainless steels are considered immune to decarburization and hydrogen attack.

The "Nelson Chart" shows operating limits for carbon and low alloy steels in hydrogen atmospheres at elevated temperature and pressures. It should be noted that the Nelson Chart is only pertinent to the two mechanisms previously cited and not to other damage mechanisms involving hydrogen (see for example reference API 941).

### B3.2 Elevated temperature effects on cuprous Alloys

Cuprous alloys are subject to a special form of hydrogen attack at elevated temperatures. If the alloy is not deoxidized, hydrogen will react with cuprous oxide to form water. Subsequently, grain boundaries will fissure. Properly deoxidized copper alloys are not susceptible.

### B3.3 Hydrogen blistering

Hydrogen blistering is not pertinent because it requires the presence of acidic electrolyte in substantial amounts. In this mechanism, steels exposed to acid electrolyte absorb large quantities of hydrogen at local cathodes and subsequently fissure and blister.

### B3.4 Sulphide stress cracking (SSC)

This is a subset of hydrogen embrittlement in which the cathodic reaction controls the cracking reaction. However, SSC occurs in water within certain ranges of hydrogen sulphide content. Certain oilfield environments and "sour" natural gas are associated with the cracking mechanism.

Consequently, if sour natural gases are mixed with Syngas or carbon monoxide mixtures, this cracking mechanism would be of concern.

### B3.5 Hydrogen induced cracking (HIC)

HIC is a degradation mode which generally occurs in sour wet gas service. In this mode of environmental damage, atomic hydrogen formed during the corrosion process is trapped in microscopic voids around nonmetallic inclusions. Usually, these are of the manganese sulfide type. High gas pressure trapped around the inclusion can generate highly localized stresses which may initiate crack nuclei parallel to the rolling direction of the material. As crack nuclei link up, stepwise cracks will develop and cause failure. HIC is sometimes referred to as "stepwise cracking".

### B3.6 Hydride formation

The degradation of mechanical properties and cracking is due to the precipitation of metal hydride phases. The most susceptible materials are titanium, magnesium and niobium alloys. The applied stress may promote the formation of hydride in some alloy systems.

### B4 Pertinent test methods

Hydrogen containing environments may affect every aspect of mechanical properties such as tensile strength, elongation, fatigue life, fatigue crack growth rate and fracture toughness. The attributes of the mechanical properties can be evaluated by conducting the pertinent experiments in the desired hydrogen environment or on hydrogen precharged specimens.

Several test methods were developed over the past years. Standard test methods appropriate for hydrogen embrittlement in gaseous hydrogen exist. Since hydrogen embrittlement and stress corrosion cracking share many common features, the tests to evaluate materials resistance to SCC can also be applied to study materials' behaviour in hydrogen, Syngas and carbon monoxide environment. Typical tests for hydrogen embrittlement are described as follows:

#### B4.1 Tensile and notched tensile properties

The susceptibility of metals to hydrogen embrittlement can be evaluated by conducting tensile tests on smooth or notched specimens in hydrogen environment at different pressures. The test method is described in ASTM G 142-98 "Standard Test Method for Determination of Susceptibility of Metals to Embrittlement in Hydrogen Containing Environments at High Pressure, High Temperature, or Both".

#### B4.2 $K_{IH}$ or $K_{ICO, Syngas}$ test

This test is a fracture mechanics test to evaluate the threshold stress intensity factor for environmental stress cracking. In this test, a precracked specimen is loaded in tension and in the gaseous environment. The minimum applied stress intensity factor that can cause crack propagation ( $K_{IH}$  or  $K_{ICO, Syngas}$ ) can be used to evaluate the resistance to environmentally assisted cracking in  $H_2$  or  $CO$ . There are various ASTM or ISO test procedures that can be modified for these tests.

#### B4.3 Slow strain rate (SSR) test

Since the environmental attack is a time dependent process, a slow strain rate test can be employed to evaluate the strain rate sensitivity of the materials in environments such as Syngas or  $CO$ . In the slow strain rate test, the test is conducted at strain rates as low as  $10^{-7}$ . The test can be done in selected environments. A general procedure of SSR tests is described in ASTM G129-00 "Standard Practice for Slow Strain Rate Testing to Evaluate the Susceptibility of Metallic Materials to Environmentally Assisted Cracking".

#### B4.4 Disk pressure test

Disk pressure test measures susceptibility to hydrogen embrittlement of metallic materials under high pressure hydrogen. A thin disk sample is placed as a membrane in a test cell is subject to high pressure helium and hydrogen. The ratio between the helium burst pressure and the hydrogen burst pressure indicates the susceptibility of the material to environmental hydrogen embrittlement. A standard test procedure has been established as ASTM F1459 "Standard Test Method for Determination of the Susceptibility of Metallic Materials to Gaseous Hydrogen Embrittlement". The ISO equivalent is ISO 11114-4. While the method was originally intended for high pressure hydrogen environments, it is possible that it could be used to evaluate metals in Syngas or carbon monoxide.

### Appendix C: Table of nominal alloy compositions & ranges

MATERIAL TYPE OR ALLOY	EN-MAT.NO. (7)	UNS NO. (8)	NOMINAL COMPOSITION RANGE
<b>Carbon Steels, Pipe</b>			
ASTM A53, Type S Grade A		K02504	C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A53, Type S Grade B		K03005	C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A106, Grade A		K02501	C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A106, Grade B		K03006	C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A333, Grade 1 <sup>(1)</sup>		K03008	C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A333, Grade 6 <sup>(1)</sup>		K03006	C, Mn, Bal. Fe
API 5L Grade A PSL1			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
API 5L Grade B PSL1 and PSL2 <sup>(1)</sup>			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
API 5L Grade X42 PSL1 and PSL2 <sup>(1)</sup>			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
API 5L Grade X46 PSL1 and PSL2 <sup>(1)</sup>			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
API 5L Grade X52 PSL1 and PSL2 <sup>(1)</sup>			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
NF A 49-211 TUE 220 b2			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
NF A 49-211 TUE 250 b2			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
NF A 49-400 TSE 220 cl. II			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
NF A 49-400 TUE 250 cl. II			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
L245 NB	1.0457		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
L245 MB	1.0418		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
L290 NB	1.0484		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
L290 MB	1.0429		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
L360 NB	1.0582		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
L360 MB	1.0572		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
P265 NL	1.0453		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
P275 NL1	1.0488		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
P355 NL1	1.0566		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
CSA Z245.1-98, 207 Categories. I, II <sup>(1)</sup> , III <sup>(1)</sup>			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
CSA Z245.1-98, 241 Categories. I, II <sup>(1)</sup> , III <sup>(1)</sup>			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
CSA Z245.1-98, 290 Categories. I, II <sup>(1)</sup> , III <sup>(1)</sup>			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
CSA Z245.1-98, 317 Categories. I, II <sup>(1)</sup> , III <sup>(1)</sup>			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
CSA Z245.1-98, 359 Categories. I, II <sup>(1)</sup> , III <sup>(1)</sup>			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
<b>Carbon Steels, Other Mill Forms</b>			
ASTM A105 (Forging)		K03504	C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A234 Grade WPB (Fitting)		K03006	C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A334 Grade 1 (Tube) <sup>(1)</sup>		K03008	C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A334 Grade 6 (Tube) <sup>(1)</sup>		K03006	C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A350 Grade LF2 (Forging) <sup>(1)</sup>		K03003	C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A352 Grade LCB (Casting) <sup>(1)</sup>		K03011	C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A352 Grade LCL (Casting) <sup>(1)</sup>			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A420 Grade WPL6 (Fitting) <sup>(1)</sup>			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A516 Grade 55 (Plate) <sup>(1)</sup>		K01800	C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A516 Grade 60 (Plate) <sup>(1)</sup>		K02100	C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A516 Grade 65 (Plate) <sup>(1)</sup>		K02403	C, Mn, Bal. Fe
ASTM A516 Grade 70 (Plate) <sup>(1)</sup>		K02700	C, Mn, Bal. Fe



## Appendix C : Table of nominal alloy compositions & ranges (Cont'd)

MATERIAL TYPE OR ALLOY	EN-MAT.NO.	UNS NO.	NOMINAL COMPOSITION RANGE
<b>Carbon Steels, Other Mill Forms (Cont'd)</b>			
NF E 29-204 BF 42N			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
NF E 29-204 BF 48N			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
NF E 29-204 BF 48F			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
NF A 49-218 AE 220			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
NF A 49-218 AE 250			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
NF A 49-218 AE 275B			C, Mn, Bal. Fe
C22.8 (Forging)	1.0460		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
P355 NH (Forging)	1.0565		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
GP240 GH (Casting)	1.0619		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
GS-38 (Casting)	1.0420		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
GS-45 (Casting)	1.0446		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
G20Mn5 (Casting)	1.6220		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
P265 GH (Plate)	1.0425		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
P355 NH (Plate)	1.0565		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
P355 NL1 (Plate)	1.0566		C, Mn, Bal. Fe
<b>Cobalt Alloys</b>			
Stellite 6	Stellit 6	R30006	55.5Co, 29Cr, 4.5W, 3Ni, 1C, 7 (Fe, Si, Mn, Mo)
Stellite 6B	Stellit 6B	R30016	53Co, 30Cr, 4.5W, 3Ni, 1C, 8.5 (Fe, Si, Mn, Mo)
<b>Copper and Copper Alloys</b>			
Brass	2.0380	Various	55-85 Cu, 15-44 Zn, 1-3 (Sn, Pb, Fe, Al)
Copper	2.0090	C10100 C10200	99.9+Cu
Copper-Nickel Alloys	2.0882	C70600 C71500	67-87 Cu, 10-31 Ni, 1-2 (Fe, Mn, Zn)
Tin Bronzes	2.1080	Various	85-89Cu, 5-11Sn, 5-10 (Zn, Pb, Ni)
<b>Ferrous Castings (Non- Stainless)</b>			
Gray Cast Iron	0.6030	F12801	3C, 2Si, 0.8Mn, Bal. Fe
Nodular Cast Iron	0.7040	F32800	3.6C, 2.7Si, 0.4Mn, Bal. Fe
Ni Resist Type D2	0.7673	F43010	20Ni, 3C, 2Si, 2Cr, 1Mn, Bal. Fe
<b>Ferrous Castings, (Stainless)</b>			
CF-3 <sup>(2)</sup>	1.4308	J92500	19.5Cr, 10Ni, 2Si, 1.5Mn, Bal. Fe
CF-8 <sup>(2)</sup>	1.4308	J92600	19.5Cr, 10Ni, 2Si, 1.5Mn, Bal. Fe
CF-3M <sup>(3)</sup>	1.4408	J92800	19Cr, 11Ni, 3Mo, 1.5Si, 1.5Mn, Bal. Fe
CF-8M <sup>(3)</sup>	1.4408	J92900	19Cr, 11Ni, 3Mo, 1.5Si, 1.5Mn, Bal. Fe
CG-8M <sup>(4)</sup>	1.4439	J93000	20Cr, 12Ni, 3Mo, 1.5Si, Bal. Fe
CN-7M <sup>(5)</sup>		N08007	21Cr, 29Ni, 4Cu, 3Mo, 1.5Si, 1.5Mn, Bal. Fe
<b>Low Alloy Steels, (C-Mo)&amp;(C-Cr-Mo)</b>			
ASTM A335, Grade P1		K11522	C, 0.5Mo, Bal. Fe
ASTM A335, Grade P2		K11547	C, 0.65Cr, 0.5Mo, Bal. Fe
ASTM A335, Grade P12		K11562	C, 1.0Cr, 0.5Mo, Bal. Fe
ASTM A335, Grade P11		K11597	C, 1.25Cr, 0.5Mo, Bal. Fe
ASTM A335, Grade P22		K21590	C, 2.25Cr, 1.0Mo, Bal. Fe

## Appendix C : Table of nominal alloy compositions & ranges (Cont'd)

MATERIAL TYPE OR ALLOY	EN-MAT.NO.	UNS NO.	NOMINAL COMPOSITION RANGE
<b>Nickel Alloys</b>			
Monel K-500 <sup>(6)</sup>	2.4375	N05500	66.5Ni, 30Cu, 3(Al, Ti)
Incoloy 800		N08800	33Ni, 21Cr, Bal. Fe
Incoloy 800H		N08810	33Ni, 21Cr, Bal. Fe
Incoloy 800HT		N08811	33Ni, 21Cr, Bal. Fe
Incoloy 825		N08825	42Ni, 21.5Cr, 3Mo, 1Ti, Bal. Fe
Hastelloy	2.4819	N10276	56Ni, 12Cr, 13.5Mo, 4Fe, 3W, 2.5Co
Inconel 600	2.4816	N06600	76Ni, 15Cr, 9Fe
Inconel 625	2.4856	N06625	60Ni, 22Cr, 9Mo, 5Fe, 4Nb
Inconel X-750 <sup>(6)</sup>	2.4669	N07750	74Ni, 15.5Cr, 7Fe, 2.5Ti, 1Al
<b>Stainless Steels, Wrought</b>			
304	1.4301/1.4306	S30400	19Cr, 9Ni, 2Mn, 1Si, Bal. Fe
304L	1.4301/1.4306	S30403	19Cr, 9Ni, 2Mn, 1Si, Bal. Fe
316	1.4401/1.4404	S31600	17Cr, 12Ni, 2Mn, 3Mo, 1Si, Bal. Fe
316L	1.4401/1.4404	S31603	17Cr, 12Ni, 2Mn, 3Mo, 1Si, Bal. Fe
316Ti	1.4401/1.4404	S31635	17Cr, 12Ni, 2Mn, 3Mo, 1Si, Ti 5xC min., Bal. Fe
321	1.4541	S32100	18Cr, 11.5Ni, Ti 5XC min., Bal. Fe
347	1.4550	S34700	18Cr, 11.5Ni, Nb 8XC min., Bal. Fe
410	1.4006/1.4024	S41000	13Cr, 1Mn, 1Si, Bal. Fe
430	1.4016/1.4742	S43000	17Cr, 1Mn, 1Si, Bal. Fe
17- 4PH H1150/H1150M Tempers <sup>(6)</sup>	1.4542/1.4548	S17400	17Cr, 4Ni, 4Cu, 1Si, Bal. Fe
X3 Ni Cr Mo 13-4	1.4313	S41500	13Cr, 4.5Ni, 1Mo, 1Si, Bal. Fe
Carpenter 20 Cb-3	2.4660	N08020	35Ni, 20Cr, 3.5Cu, 2.5Mo, Bal. Fe

### Notes :

- (1) Toughness testing required by specification or PSL2 requirement
- (2) Cast Analogs of 304L/304 stainless steel
- (3) Cast Analogs of 316L/316 stainless steels
- (4) Cast Analog of 317 stainless steel
- (5) Alloy 20
- (6) Age Hardened Condition, lower strength temper or hardness limits imposed
- (7) EN-MAT.N°:the method to give a number for materials is given in the European standard EN 10027-2 "Designation systems for steel Part 2 Numerical system"
- (8) UNS: Metals and Alloys in the UNIFIED NUMBERING SYSTEM, Society of Automotive Engineers, Warrendale, PA, 9<sup>th</sup> Edition, 2001.

## **Appendix D: Metallurgical factors affecting toughness and brittle fracture mechanisms**

### **D1. Introduction**

It is generally acknowledged that engineering alloys used in the transmission of high pressure gas via pipelines must have adequate toughness. In addition, it is also acknowledged that hydrogen gas may embrittle and adversely affect the toughness of many engineering alloys. Gas parameters that may affect toughness and related properties include factors such as hydrogen purity, gas composition, temperature and pressure. In addition, there are metallurgical factors which also play an important role. This section will briefly touch on the metallurgical factors which are considered significant in hydrogen embrittlement.

### **D2. Crystal structure**

The major engineering alloys have crystal structures which are face centered cubic (FCC), body centered cubic (BCC) and hexagonal closed-packed (HCP). Under certain conditions such as rapid quenching and welding, suppressed allotropic transformation will result in the formation of martensite, a body centered tetragonal lattice. Strain induced martensite is also possible. Generally, the highest toughness is achieved with FCC structures followed by BCC and HCP. The most common used alloys for the transmission of high pressure gas are carbon steels which have a BCC structure. Also, while nickel alloys generally have FCC structure, some of them are subject to embrittlement in H<sub>2</sub>.

### **D3. Key Metallurgical controls**

Key metallurgical controls or techniques which impact toughness and play a role in line pipe steels are as follows:

- Controls on alloy chemistry
- Inclusion shape control additives
- Fine grained microstructures
- Use of killed steels
- Low or reduced carbon equivalents
- Microalloying

It should be noted that some of the above fall in more than one category and are related in terms of the effects on toughness.

### **D4. Controls on alloy chemistry**

The effects of sulfur and phosphorus contents on the toughness of steel have been known for some time. Elements such as sulfur, phosphorus, antimony, tin and arsenic and their compounds also have been found to inhibit the hydrogen recombination reaction, thus increasing the charging of atomic hydrogen into the alloy.

Sulfur is usually present in the form of elongated sulfide inclusions. High concentrations of sulfide inclusions reduce toughness particularly in the transverse direction of pipes or plates. With modern steel making processes, maximum sulfur levels of 0.01% are feasible and desirable for high toughness wrought mill forms.

Phosphorus has a deleterious effect on toughness. It raises the impact transition temperature by as much as 8 °C (15 °F) for each increase of 0.01%P. A maximum level of 0.015% P is recommended.

Carbon and manganese levels are very important in carbon steels. A Mn:C ratio of at least 3:1 is desirable. Mn tends to reduce the impact transition temperature while C will raise it. However, high Mn:C ratios when carbon levels are high may cause problems with hardenability and weldability.

#### D5. Sulfide shape control

The detrimental effect of sulfide inclusions is primarily due to their shapes which are elongated with sharp ends and akin to cracks. Additions of species such as rare earth elements or calcium can modify the sulfide shape to produce sulfide inclusions with globular shapes which do not reduce toughness. Sulfide shape control technology can be used in conjunction with reduced maximum sulfur levels.

#### D6. Killed steels

Control of residual oxygen by utilizing “killing” agents or deoxidizers will improve toughness. Aluminum killing has the additional advantage of forming aluminum nitrides which contribute to forming fine grained microstructures. Silicon and reactive metals such as vanadium, titanium etc. may also be used to kill or deoxidize steels.

#### D7. Microstructure and effects of fine grained microstructure

Martensitic, normalized and hot formed microstructures are used in mill forms of carbon and low alloy steels. Quench and tempered martensite generally has the highest toughness and this is followed by fine grained normalized microstructure. In line pipe, quench and tempered martensite structures are relatively rare. Normalized and hot formed microstructures are commonly encountered. When high toughness is needed, normalizing is the most usual approach for line pipe. Normalizing produces a uniform fine grained microstructure when done properly. A change in the microstructure of one ASTM grain size can shift the ductile to brittle transition temperature by approximately 10-15°C.

Thermomechanical processing typically used in the manufacture of ERW microalloyed line pipe is another technique for obtaining fine grained microstructure. The toughness of such steels greatly exceeds that of line pipe steels produced by traditional carbon steel processing techniques.

#### D8. Control of Carbon Equivalent

Welding is a necessary consideration in the fabrication of high pressure industrial gas pipelines. In conventional carbon steel metallurgy, carbon and manganese are the major elements responsible for developing necessary strength properties but other elements such as Cr, Mo, Ni, Cu etc. will also contribute.

The major problem is that as the levels of alloying elements increase, the hardenability increases and so does the potential for forming hard and brittle untempered martensite after welding. The presence of brittle untempered martensite can lead to microcracks and increase susceptibility to failure mechanisms involving hydrogen.

One method of control is to place limitations on chemistry for pipelines or component steels by the carbon equivalent approach. There are various carbon equivalent formulas but the most common carbon equivalent (C.E.) formula in use today is:

$$CE = \%C + \frac{\%Mn}{6} + \frac{\%Cr + \%Mo + \%V}{5} + \frac{\%Ni + \%Cu}{15}$$

In older references, a carbon equivalent of 0.55 maximum was considered to be the limit for steels such as API 5L X52 in hydrogen service. More recently, a maximum carbon equivalent of 0.43 has been cited as the maximum allowable for pipelines, but special cases may require lower carbon equivalent levels.

With respect to the newer microalloyed steels with low carbon contents, alternative carbon equivalent formulas may be utilized. For steels with low carbon contents or carbon equivalents equal to or less than 0.12%, the composition parameter  $P_{cm}$ , has been found to be a better indicator of crack susceptibility. This parameter developed by Ito-Bessyo is as follows:

$$P_{cm} = \%C + (\%Mn + \%Si + \%Cu + \%Co) / 20 + \%Ni / 60 + \%Mo / 15 + \%V / 10 + 5 \%B$$

The acceptable limit is 0.20% maximum.

#### D9. Weld Heat Affected Zone (HAZ) Hardness

Controls over the weld and weld heat affect zone hardness can be improved to eliminate or minimize the presence of hard brittle untempered martensite. Both weld procedure and weld operator qualification can be controlled with respect to weld and HAZ hardness. The most common hardness limitation is a level of Rockwell C 22 which is equivalent to Vickers 248. Typically, mounted weld samples are tested using microhardness techniques. The hardness limitation has been applied to pipe parent metal in sour gas services and it is applicable to hydrogen service also.

#### D10. Pre and post weld stress relief

One option for controlling weld HAZ hardness when welding steels which may be susceptible to HAZ martensite formation is through modification of the welding process. Pre weld heat thermal treatment helps prevent martensite formation while post weld heat treatment will temper any martensite and stress relieve the HAZ simultaneously. Generally, pre and post weld heat treatments have added costs and the preferred approach is to place limitations on alloy chemistry.

In regard to an assessment of austenite stability and microstructural constituents, some familiarity with the following parameters may be needed:

- 1) Stability factor ( $\Delta$ )
- 2) Austenite transformation factors ( $M_s$ ,  $M_d30$ )
- 3) Chromium equivalent,  $C_{req}$
- 4) Nickel Equivalent,  $N_{eq}$

The parameters are defined in an earlier section but Peckner and Bernstein's "Handbook of Stainless Steels" is recommended as a reference for additional background.

#### D11. Metastable Austenitic Stainless Steels

Austenitic stainless steels have excellent toughness and resistance to environmental damage for mechanisms involving hydrogen. In certain austenitic stainless steels such as 201, 301, 302, 304, 304L and 321, the austenite is metastable and may transform to martensite when strained, particularly, when temperature is reduced. The presence of strain induced martensite in excessive amount is detrimental; increases in magnetism in cold worked or strain hardened metastable austenitic steels may be due to the presence of strain induced martensite or delta ferrite.

The problems with metastable austenitic stainless steels are not likely to be severe at low hydrogen pressure but might be of concern at high pressures. A solution for high pressure is to select austenitic stainless steels with high austenite stability, e.g., 316 or 316L.

#### D12. Strength level

In low strength carbon steels, hydrogen damage occurs predominantly by loss in tensile ductility or blistering. Low strength steels usually fail in a ductile mode in hydrogen environment. Higher strength carbon steels are prone to hydrogen embrittlement and usually fracture in a brittle mode. At the same strength level, a quenched and tempered fine grain microstructure is more resistance to hydrogen cracking than the normalized microstructure.

The susceptibility of stainless steels to hydrogen embrittlement is also dependent on the strength level. Ferritic stainless steels are resistant to hydrogen embrittlement at low strength levels. Austenitic stainless steels are highly resistant or immune to hydrogen cracking in the annealed or lightly cold worked condition. Martensitic and precipitation hardening stainless steels are extremely susceptible to hydrogen embrittlement with increasing yield strength. The lower strength tempers of precipitation hardening steels are preferred for hydrogen services.

#### D13. Microalloyed steels

A major development in the area of line pipe has been the introduction of microalloyed steels; particularly, in ERW pipe. Microalloying refers to the use of small amounts of alloying elements which produce an effect generally very significant and seemingly out of proportion to the amount added. Examples of microalloying agents include: Nb, V, Ti, rare earth elements and Ca.

The use of microalloyed steels coupled with the special thermal mechanical processing results in steels with very fine grained microstructures, exceptional toughness and weldability due to low carbon equivalent. The high strength and low carbon equivalent combinations are superior to conventional carbon steels with carbon and manganese as the major alloying elements.

The major microalloying element used in ERW line pipe is Nb. Ca addition may be made for sulfide shape control. V is usually the major microalloying agent in seamless weld pipe. Specification API 5L places controls on the total amount of major elements typically used in microalloyed steel line pipe.

It is very possible that many users of line pipes are using microalloyed steels and are unaware of this.

#### D14. Welding

There have been references to welding in previous portions of this section. Welding is extremely critical. The welding process should produce defect free welds and weld heat affected zones which match the mechanical and toughness properties of the line pipe being joined. It is important that hardness levels in the weld and weld heat affected zone be controlled to avoid hard spots. Weld filler metals, weld process qualification, weld operator qualification, mechanical tests, metallographic techniques and NDT techniques all play a role in ensuring that the fabricated pipeline has adequate toughness for hydrogen applications.

## Appendix F: Example of preventive maintenance programme for carbon monoxide and syngas pipelines

Note: Intervals shown are only examples and do not reflect required or universal practice.

### a. Pipeline systems

		Checking interval						
Underground pipelines		1 Month	3 Months	6 Months	1 Year	3 Year	5 Year	When required
	Pipeline patrol	X						
	Pipeline patrol in critical areas	Daily						
	On-foot servicing inspection				X			
	Pipeline risers and casing inspection			X				
	Effect of mining (subsidence)					X		
Above-ground pipelines								
	Pipeline patrol and servicing			X				
	Pipe bridges- inspection and painting				X			
	Supports and anchorages						X	
	Inner pipeline inspection							X

### b. Cathodic protection

		Checking interval						
		1 Month	3 Months	6 Months	1 Year	3 Year	5 Year	When required
	Drainage stations	X						
	Impressed current stations	X						
	Protection devices against AC	X						
	Pipe/ground DC potential, on/off			X				
	Pipe/ground AC potential and current			X				
	Earths, anodes, connections fuses, spark gaps			X				
	Insulating joints			X				
	Overall CP effectiveness				X			
	Coating defect detection in sensitive areas						X	
	Comprehensive system audit							X

**c. Checking of stations**

		Checking interval						
		1 Month	3 Months	6 Months	1 Year	3 Year	5 Year	When required
	General tightness	X						
	Telecommunication system	X						
	Record measurements gas detector	X						
	Emergency shut-off valve			X				
	Valves, control valves, etc.				X			
	Cleaning filter				X			
	Safety valve (if any )					X		
	Cleaning and repainting piping			X				
	Calibration flow meters						X	

**d. Safety management system**

		Checking interval						
		1 Month	3 Months	6 Months	1 Year	2 Year	3 Year	When required
	Training of personnel				X			
	Emergency response plan- test and update				X			
	Audit Safety Management System						X	
	Leak Detection System - test				X			
	Information to authorities					X		



## Appendix G: Composition criteria for CO and Syngas

This document specifically refers to carbon monoxide and syngas as defined below :

State : Gas

Components (molar) :

Water : less than 20 PPM (dew point @ 1 atmosphere = -55 °C/-67 °F)

Inerts and / or methane (natural gas): balance

CO<sub>2</sub> : less than 100 PPM


H<sub>2</sub> and CO per Classification of H<sub>2</sub> / CO Mixtures diagram

Other components : negligible

It is important to note that moisture is a critical contaminant in this context and this document should not be used for mixtures in which condensation of moisture may be expected to occur.

See the EIGA/CGA/AIGA publication Hydrogen transportation pipelines

### Classification of Gas Mixtures Containing H<sub>2</sub> and / or CO




## Appendix J: Probability acceptance criteria

Reference is made to the article “An overview of quantitative risk measures for loss of life and economic damage”, by S.N. Jonkman, P.H.A.J.M. van Gelder and J.K. Vrijling, published in the Journal of Hazardous Materials

### Examples of risk criteria applicable in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom

The individual risk is defined as the probability for a person remaining at a given open air location at all times being fatally injured as a result of any abnormal event affecting the pipe.

The societal risk takes into account the number of fatalities, which may occur in the case of an abnormal event affecting the pipe. The required minimum probability of the abnormal event decreases with the number of fatalities



### Probability of CO toxicity risk using Probit functions

A probit equation can be used to determine the probability of fatality from a toxic exposure. The probit equation is:

$$\text{Probit} = A + B \ln(C^n t)$$

Where A, B and n are material specific probit coefficients from toxic exposures to animals, C is the concentration of the toxic material in ppm and t is the exposure time in minutes.

The probability of fatality is given by a normal distribution function. A probit of 2.67 corresponds to a 1% chance of fatality. A probit of 5 corresponds to approximately 50% chance of fatality. A probit of 8 is assumed to mean 100% chance of fatality.

The commercially available consequence modelling programme, PHAST, provides by default the probit coefficients for carbon monoxide.

	A	B	n
PHAST	-37.98	3.7	1

The probit values were compared with the expected impact (referring to 4.2.2) of the exposure concentration and duration listed above. This comparison is summarized below.

Concentration (ppm)	Exposure time (min)	Effects description in EIGA document	PHAST probit	Percentage of fatalities
1 500	30	Headache, nausea, poisoning and fatal in case of prolonged exposure (more than 30 minutes)	1.66	< 1%
2 500	60	Rapid collapse , death in one or two hours	6.12	87 %
5 000	30	Massive poisoning , death in less than one hour	6.12	87 %
7000	10	1% fatalities	3.30	4.5 %
10 000	10	Death in 10 to 15 minutes	4.62	35 %
50 000	2	Instantaneous poisoning , immediately fatal	4.62	35 %

For the 7000 ppm exposure for 10 minutes, the probit is above the 1% fatality (i.e. probit of 2.67) listed in table above as a description of the impact of such an exposure.

The rest of the descriptions listed in the above table appear to agree well with the probability of fatalities predicted by the probit. The probit for the exposures are around 5 (i.e. 50% chance of fatality for such an exposure).

Although there is not universal consensus on the probit values that should be used for these calculations, probits can provide a better understanding of the impact of concentrations and/or durations that are not listed in the table and the impact of exposure to time-varying concentrations of CO.

## **Appendix K: References**

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ASM Handbook "Welding, Brazing and Soldering", Vol. 6, ASM International, Metals Park, OH 1993

### **ASME**

Pipeline Design and Construction published by ASME in 2000, pages 581-604

B31.3 : Pressure Piping for Refineries and Chemical Plants

B31.8 : Gas transmission and distribution piping systems

### **API**

API 5L : Specification for line pipe

API 520 : Sizing, selection and installation of pressure-relieving devices in refineries

API 521 : Guide for pressure-relieving and depressuring systems

API 941: Recommended Practice for Steels for Hydrogen Service at Elevated Temperatures and Pressures in Petroleum Refineries and Petrochemical Plants

API 1104: Welding of pipelines and related facilities

API RP500 A, B, C: Recommended practice for classification of locations for electrical installations at petroleum facilities

### **ASTM**

G 142: Standard Test method for Determination of Susceptibility of Metals to Embrittlement in Hydrogen Containing Environment at High pressure, High Temperature or both

G 129: Standard Practice for Slow Strain Rate Testing to Evaluate the Susceptibility of Metallic Materials to Environmentally Assisted Cracking

F 1459: Standard test method for determination of the susceptibility of metallic materials to gaseous hydrogen embrittlement

### **ATEX**

94/9: European directive on explosive atmospheres

### **NASA**

Safety Standard for Hydrogen and Hydrogen Systems: Guidelines for Hydrogen System Design, Materials Selection, Operations, Storage and Transportation

### **NACE**

MR0 175-2000: Standard Material Requirements for Sulphide Stress Cracking Resistant Metallic Materials for Oilfield Equipment

Standard TM0284-96, item N°21215, Standard test method, Evaluation of pipeline and pressure vessel steels for resistance to hydrogen-induced cracking

Standard RP0177-95: Mitigation of Alternating Current and Lightning Effects on Metallic Structures and Corrosion Control Systems

Standard RP01-98: Control of corrosion under thermal installation and fire proofing material

Standard RP05 02: Pipeline external corrosion direct assessment methodology

**EIGA**

Doc 100: Hydrogen Cylinders and Transport Vessels  
 Doc 15: Gaseous Hydrogen Stations  
 Doc 95: Recommendation for the Avoidance of Failure of CO and CO/CO<sub>2</sub> Mixture Cylinders  
 DOC 75/01: Determination of safety distances

**CGA**

G 5.4: Standard for hydrogen piping systems at consumer locations  
 G 5.5: Hydrogen vent systems

**ISO**

ISO 13623: Petroleum and natural gas industries-Pipeline transportation systems  
 EN ISO 11114-Part 1: Gas Cylinder. Compatibility of Gas cylinder and valve materials with gas contents: Metallic materials  
 EN ISO 11114-Part 2: Gas cylinders. Compatibility with non-Metals  
 EN ISO 11114-Part 4: Hydrogen compatibility-Test methods  
 ISO 9809: Cylinder design  
 ISO 11120: Jumbo tubes design

**EN**

EN1594: Gas supply systems- Pipelines for maximum operating pressures over 16 bars  
 EN 14161: same as ISO 13623  
 EN 10208-2: Steel pipes for pipelines for combustible fluids  
 EN 12954: Cathodic protection of buried or immersed metallic structures  
 EN10285: Steel tubes and fittings for on and offshore pipelines- External three layer extruded polyethylene based coatings  
 EN12732: Gas supply systems. Welding steel pipework- Functional requirements  
 EN60079-10: Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres- Part 10: Classification of hazardous Areas  
 EN60079-14: Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres- Part 14: Electrical installations in hazardous areas  
 EN61508: Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety related systems

**NFPA**

NFPA 50A: Standard for gaseous hydrogen systems at consumer sites  
 NFPA - 70 : National Electric Code  
 NFPA-496: Purged enclosures  
 NFPA-497: Locations for electrical installations in chemical process areas

**IEC**

IEC 79: Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres

**GERMAN STANDARDS**

TRFL: Technische Regel für Rohrfernleitungsanlagen (2003)

**BRITISH STANDARDS**

BS 8010: Pipelines, Part 2. Pipelines on land : design , construction and installation  
 BS PD 8010: Part 1, Pipelines on land : design , construction and installation (scheduled to be issued in 2004)

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